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“Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”. This is the famous question that was once attributed 
to the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This remark sarcastically captures a latent 
communication issue between Europe and the rest of the international actors. José Manuel Barroso, 
former President of the European Commission, once vaguely addressed this issue, stating that the 
EU was not one single country: “ We are not the United States, we are not China, we are not Russia 
and we do not want to be… we are a union of states, so by definition our system is more complex”, 
Barroso said. Kissinger’s never answered question can be linked with the Red Phone. The so-called 
Moscow-Washington hotline provided direct contact between leaders of the United States and 
Russia. This “line” was established as a communication system that worked as a mechanism for 
the prevention of tensions and subsequent nuclear wars. Kissinger’s question put on the table the 
existence of communication gaps between state actors and the EU. However, the present paper 
aims at pointing out the fact that this limitation does not end at the institutional level because it also 
involves European citizens. 
The acknowledgement of communication gaps between the European Union and its citizens 
plays a pivotal role in the present essay. However, what is a communication gap? It is commonly 
understood that a communication gap or communication deficit occurs when the message intended 
by the sender is not properly understood by the recipient. The present paper elaborates on this 
definition and presents literature proving the existence of an array of communication gaps between 
the EU and the European citizens. 
Wutz1 outlines the possible causes of the communication gaps. Firstly, communications 
between the EU and EU citizens depend on national journalists who mainly communicate with 
their national politicians. Every piece of news is filtered by this national lens which undermines 
EU-EU citizens relations. Secondly, direct communication between Brussels and its citizens is still 
a challenge since there is a clash between a rational and technical conception of what the EU is and 
a much more emotionally driven insight of the citizens. EU citizens would also feel more connected 
to the EU if the EU legal language was to be simplified. However, the EU is struggling to find a 
way to turn this into reality. Finally, digital, and technological change is still a challenge for the 
EU. Communication and democracy are closely linked and there is still a lot of work to do to turn 
social media communications into a useful, easy, and direct communication channel2.  
The main aim of this paper is to propose a specific course of action to close these 
communication gaps: the bottom-up approach to communications. There are two main ways of 
approaching the field of communications: the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach. On 
the one hand, the top-down approach to communications is generally refused by the literature as it 
is presented as an outdated communication strategy in which citizens’ views are perceived as 
second-class opinions. On the other hand, the bottom-up approach or audience-centric approach to 
communications is widely accepted by the authors as the best communicative strategy to close the 
                                                             
1 “Why is Europe having trouble communicating with its citizens? | COFACE”, COFACE Families Europe, 2020, 
Retrieved January 27, 2021, from http://www.coface-eu.org/europe/why-is-europe-having-trouble-connecting-with-
its-citizens/. 
2 Ibid. 
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communication gaps between the EU and its citizens. This is the case because this approach 
involves the establishment of proactive communicative dialogues with recurrent feedback from 
both parties. The literature considers these proactive dialogues to be essential to close 
communication gaps. In sum, the audience-centric approach to communications is put forward as 
the best communicative tool to fill communication gaps. 
It appears that there is a connection between the audience-centric approach to communications 
and European primary law. The present paper examines this link with the legal framework of the 
EU and analyses the references to democratic participations in EU treaties. 
Opening a dialogue on public sector communication is important because this sector is usually 
blamed for its excessive bureaucracy, slowness, inefficiency, and corruption. These perceptions 
worsened the relationship between the EU and its citizens. EU citizens are now used to the fast 
pace system of private firms, thanks to which they receive goods and services almost instantly and 
anywhere. For instance, Amazon is currently able to provide one to two-day delivery of goods. 
According to the literature, these new services provided by private companies set high standards 
which are impossible to be met by the public administration. Such quick responses are not feasible 
in public institutions as bureaucracy burdens any chances to provide instant feedback to citizens’ 
demands. As Canel & Luoma-aho7 puts it, the EU is unable to keep up with the new expectations 
of public sector organisations. The public sector is still unable to establish a communication 
mechanism between citizens and the EU as sturdy as the technologically empowered private firms. 
Private firms have given voice to the public eye and now receive constant and live feedback to 
improve, change or evolve their products by actively listening to their clients’ demands8. 
The democratic gaps of the EU seem to be one of the reasons behind the recurrent low 
participation rate of the European Parliament elections. Although the 2019 European Parliament 
election yielded its highest participation (50.66%) in the last 25 years, the levels of participation of 
national and European parliamentary elections is still noteworthy. Democratic participation is 
ultimately undermined when an array of EU citizens does not vote. This directly affects the 
legitimacy of the institution as well as the accountability of its actions as an international 
organisation9. 
The present paper suggests that an efficient EU communication strategy could lead to a change 
in the public eye’s perception of the public sector. The EU needs to fill this gap and connect with 
its citizens since they are the reason for the EU to exist. Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights enriches citizens of the Union to access the documents of the institutions, bodies, offices, 
and agencies of the Union. However, not only should European citizens be able to access 
information about public bodies but also to interact proactively with EU institutions. If done well, 
                                                             
7 “What Is Changing in Public Sector Communication?”, from Public Sector Communication, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2018, Retrieved February 14, 2021, from 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781119135630.ch1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 C. SCHÄFER, “Indifferent and Eurosceptic: The motivations of EU-only abstainers in the 2019 European Parliament 
election”, Politics, 2021, SAGE Publications Inc., Retrieved March 14, 2021, from 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0263395720981359. 
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EU citizens could be fully informed of the work that the EU does on their behalf or even work hand 
in hand with the decision-making structure of the institution. 
This essay defends the bottom-up model as the most convenient approach for European 
communications at the EU. This text is aimed at illustrating the reader with several aspects related 
to EU communications: 
 The first section comprises a historical account to raise awareness about possible 
missteps taken by the European Commission during times of political hardship. 
 The second section tackles the legal framework of the EU’s communication strategy. 
This section unfolds a possible breach of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) during 
the second Barroso Commission. Moreover, the section raises the possibility of the 
audience-centric approach as the sole appropriate method to comply with the legal 
framework. 
 The third section encompasses internal and external communication theory. The 
literature points towards the top-down approach on both internal and external 
approaches as the only feasible pathway towards complying with the legal framework 
of the EU’s communication strategy. 
 The fourth section deals with the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) as a paradigmatic 
example of the European Commission’s audience-centric approach to 
communications. It is concluded that the ECI is perceived as a proactive tool, an 
enabler for campaigns and debates yet it was still in a very early stage as it appears not 
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Studying the European communications model is relevant for the politics and international 
relations fields since the communication strategy of a public institution directly affects the 
legitimacy, accountability, and democratic nature of the institution itself. A solid and effective 
communications model can contribute to avoiding losing its legitimacy in the public eye10. EU’s 
communications have been politicised and instrumentalised to support political decisions. 
However, this attempt to instrumentalise communications harms the reputation of communications 
as an effective tool to strengthen public accountability. Communications cannot solve issues such 
as bureaucracy, slowness, inefficiency, or corruption. 11 
The establishment of two-way communication channels between the EU and EU citizens can 
strengthen the EU in the public eye. Legitimacy in the eyes of those who ultimately pay for the 
existence of this Union is crucial for the accountability of the EU. Ultimately, the EU must be 
accountable both to the member states of the EU and to third party countries. Communications is 
often a challenging road for public institutions as they struggle to achieve citizen satisfaction. 
The scope of this paper considers the EU and its citizens both as senders and recipients of 
information. The nature of the audience-centric model entails that sender and recipient are 
interchangeable roles. The reasoning behind this interchangeable nature is found in the theory of 
communications itself: the audience-centric approach to communications involves this two-way 
communicative channel in which both the sender and receiver must play both roles to comply with 
the fundamentals of a bottom-up approach. In other words, while on some occasions the EU is the 
recipient of the feedback provided by the European citizens, on other occasions the tables are 
turned. This is a natural consequence of the audience-centric approach, which is recurrently 
mentioned throughout the present paper. 
Communication cannot solve economic, social, political or environmental problems but it can 
turn into a beacon for the promotion of identity, integration and democracy12. The origin of the 
word communication dates back to Old French comunicacion (14c., Modern French 
communication) and directly from Latin communicationem and means “to share; to make common; 
common, public, general”13. 
This paper looks at both internal and external communications as an object of study. Internal 
communication is a strategic management tool that is proven useful for an organisation to act 
efficiently within its internal system14. There are many types of organisational structures and there 
                                                             
10 M.-J. CANEL; V. LUOMA-AHO, Public Sector Communication, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2018, 
Retrieved March 20, 2021, from http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781119135630. 
11 M.-J. CANEL; V. LUOMA-AHO, “What Is Changing in Public Sector Communication?”, cit. 
12 C. VALENTINI; G. NESTI, “Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives and Challenges ”, 
2010, Retrieved 14 febrero 2021, en 
https://books.google.es/books?id=b0AaBwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
13 ETYMONLINE.COM, “Etymology Dictionary”, 2021, Retrieved February 14, 2021, from 
https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=communication. 
14 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMMUNICATION, Communication Handbook for the EU Agencies , 2013, Retrieved 
February 14, 2021, from https://1library.net/document/zxnp5jnq-communication-handbook-for-the-eu-agencies.html. 
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is no hierarchy in terms of which one is better than the other. However, each organisation must 
find the organisational culture that works to fulfil the aims of the institution itself. Internal 
communications do not stop at the internal structure of the institution since they have effects on 
external communications as well. This connection between internal communications and external 
communications is further explained in the present paper. As an introductory fact, data shows that 
fostering an organisational culture leads to improving public satisfaction and explains up to 28% 
of customer satisfaction15.  
Public relations (PR) or external communications is the study of the communication gaps 
between an organisation and its targeted public. PR aims at enhancing the communication flow 
between the institution and its target audience. In the case of a public administration institution, PR 
focuses on citizens and stakeholders. Current PR theories emphasise the need to listen to the public 
interest by establishing bilateral communication channels in order to learn from the feedback 
received from the public interest. Any decision taken from the point of view of PR must respect 
public interest and act accordingly with the feedback provided16. According to Pocovnicu17, the 
main objectives of PR are the following: 
Gaining the trust of the general public regarding the institution and the services provided; knowing and 
anticipating the expectations of the current and potential audience; stimulating the opinion leaders; engaging 
the audience through various activities, programmes and events; consolidating the relations with mass 
media, private institutions, agencies and NGOs; developing an institutional image within cultural 
environments; ensuring transparency for the institutions’ actions towards a specific audience; 
complementing the weaknesses of other communication forms used by the public administration institution. 
18 
The political problems of the EU sometimes intentionally clash with communicative strategy 
issues. This is only the case because the political institutions attempt to instrumentalise 
communicative tools for the benefit of political matters. This is a burden for EU communications 
since PR is not meant to solve political problems or to contribute to justify political actions. For 
instance, this was the case when a series of referenda took place in an array of Member States 
regarding the Constitutional Treaty. These referenda constituted a politicised and instrumentalised 
mean of communication as it was biasedly interpreted to favour the EU’s interest. The Joint 
Statement on the results of the referendum in the Netherlands on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe19 claimed that the EU respected the choices made by the voters in both 
France and the Netherlands. However, the statement also conveyed that the EU was still convinced 
of the viability of the European Constitution20. This is a vivid example of how communicative tools 
such as referenda were being politicised and instrumentalised to support political decisions. In this 
                                                             
15 M.-J. CANEL; V. LUOMA-AHO, Public Sect. Commun., cit. 
16 D. POCOVNICU, Public Relations in Public Administration: Role and Management, in a Socio-Political Marketing 
Context, 2014, Retrieved March 20, 2021, from http://sceco.ub.ro. 
17 Ibid., p. 217. 
18 Ibid. 
19 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, IP/05/653 Joint Statement of President of the European Parliament Josep Borrell 
Fontelles, President of the European Council Jean-Claude Juncker and President of the European Commission José 
Manuel Barroso on the results of the referendum in the Netherlands on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe., 2005, Retrieved March 7, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_05_653. 
20 Ibid. 
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case, the referenda did not result favourable to what the UE wanted to accomplish. Therefore, the 
results of the referenda were ignored as the text of the Constitutional Treaty was brought back with 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
The most pivotal concepts of the present paper are top-down and bottom-up communications. 
These are central in the discussion as this paper aims at urging for the top-down model as the best 
communicative strategy for the EU to fit their practices in such a volatile environment as the field 
of communications. While bottom-up communications, also known as audience-centric 
communications is preferred by many communication experts, top-down communications are 
usually refused by the authors. The concepts are the following: 
 External Top-down communications: traditional and outdated communications strategy 
based on a purely hierarchical structure in which the institutions views play a pivotal role 
while the target audience is relegated and perceived as second-class opinions. This 
approach is unidirectional and purely informative where there is no room for conversation 
between the institution and the target audience.21 
 External Bottom-up communications: Approach to communications consisting of building 
proactive communicative dialogues with the target audience which involves the 
establishment of the so-called bidirectional or two-way communicative channels to ensure 
inclusive participation. The audience plays an active role and establishes a communicative 
dialogue with the institution involving recurrent feedback.22 
The EU adopted a top-down approach communication strategy from its birth until the 1970s. 
From the 1970s onwards, the EU is attempting to establish an audience-centric approach to 
communications as the literature suggests that it is the most effective method to connect with target 
audiences, in this case, EU citizens.  
The EU currently leans towards this top-down, audience-centric strategy which allows for 
better bidirectional channels with EU citizens. Finding both the most suitable internal 
communications strategy and the appropriate external communications scheme is the ultimate 
objective that a public institution such as the EU should foster in order to excel at communications. 
The hypothesis of the present paper is the following: The EU should opt for the enhancement 
and improvement of the already implemented audience-centric approach as it appears to be the 
most plausible course of action towards complying with the democratic provisions of the European 
primary law. The EU should discard any remnant and/or setback to top-bottom approaches. 
Improving and promoting e-participating tools as well as reinforcing the integration process 
of the EU constitute the right course of action to strengthen liaisons between the EU and EU 
citizens. EU’s communication strategy should remain audience-centric since it’s proven to be the 
most effective strategy.  
                                                             
21 M.-J. CANEL; V. LUOMA-AHO, Public Sect. Commun., cit.; V. LUOMA‐AHO; M. CANEL, The Handbook of Public 
Sector Communication, Wiley, 2020. 
22 M.-J. CANEL; V. LUOMA-AHO, Public Sect. Commun., cit.; V. LUOMA‐AHO; M. CANEL, Handb. Public Sect. 
Commun., cit. 
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Further enhancement of e-participation tools such as the Europe for Citizens Programme or 
Communicating Europe in Partnership is highly recommended throughout this paper. Additionally, 
further work on language policies and the simplification of EU texts should be promoted.  Greater 
European integration would lower the feeling of detachment among EU citizens, usually 
materialised in political doctrines such as Euroscepticism and extremism. 
 
The Communication Gaps 
 
The communication deficit is now playing a pivotal role in the EU and has turned into a binding 
institutional priority led by the strategic plans drafted by the Commission. Public communication 
is not a secondary sphere within the system of the EU but rather the cornerstone for its correct 
functioning. The present paper defends the idea that an audience-centric communication strategy 
plan would allow for greater interaction with EU citizens and the EU. 
One of the EU’s main aims is to make the EU’s governing institutions more transparent and 
democratic to the public eye. In order to accomplish this goal, the EU’s adopted a facilitator role 
between the decisions taken in Brussels and the EU citizens23 and tackle the challenges of a 
globalized and rapid-changing world. EU citizens’ increasing engagement with the EU is the result 
of the historical evolution of the approach to the communication strategy of the EU which went 
from a top-bottom approach to a bottom-up approach. In general terms, the EU’s approach towards 
communications has evolved from a top-down approach in pre-Barroso periods towards the 
bottom-up approach embraced by Jean-Clause Juncker, former President of the European 
Commission and followed by Ursula von der Leyen, the current President of the European 
Commission24. 
The European Parliament, the only elected body of the EU and the representation of EU 
citizens, has been provided with a greater role within the decision-making process of the institution. 
The Amsterdam Treaty extended the co-decision procedure by which legislation could be adopted 
at first reading if the Parliament and the Council agreed. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty changed the 
name of the co-decision legislative procedure to ordinary legislative procedure and extended 
powers to almost all areas of EU law25. These treaties set the ground for the solid role of the 
Parliament in the decision-making structure of the EU.  
Despite the rising representation of the Parliament, direct communication channels between 
the EU and EU citizens have been encouraged as a means to increase the legitimacy of the 
institution in the public eye. Many would argue that a lack of effective communication between 
Brussels and the EU population has resulted in a growing feeling of detachment. Such feeling of 
detachment represents a threat to European integration as it leads towards political doctrines such 
as Euroscepticism and extremism. Therefore, e-participation tools are seen as a means to tackle 
                                                             
23 EUROPA.EU, “The EU in brief | European Union”, 2020, Retrieved January 24, 2021, from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en. 
24 C. VALENTINI; G. NESTI, “Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives and Challenges ”, 
cit. 
25 B. HIX, S HØYLAND, S. HIX y B. HØYLAND, “Legislative Politics”, in S. HIX y B. HØYLAND, The Political 
System of the European Union, vol. 3rd ed., London, 2011. 
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that problem. E-participation tools are perceived as an alternative form of engagement for EU 
citizens to help the EU regain citizens’ trust27. These tools help to narrow the democratic deficit 
and offers an alternative to the traditional view of politics28. 
The “communication gaps” between the EU and its citizens have been a subject of discussion 
since the entry in force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Communication started as one-way, 
institution-centred communication. There was a general feeling that there was much more work to 
be done since the EU’s communication strategy focused on explaining what the EU does rather 
than listening to the voices of EU citizens. The White Paper on a European Communication Policy29 
of 2006 proposed a major shift in the EU’s communication strategy from a top-bottom approach to 
a bottom-up approach. The one-way communication approach was criticised in the White Paper 
and a citizen-centred or audience-centred approach was proposed as a replacement for the former 
strategy. The White Paper emphasizes communication as a cornerstone for healthy democracy. It 
urges for an effective policy communication programme for the EU and outlines previous efforts 
to reinforce communication strategies such as reinforcing the Commission representation offices, 
improving internal coordination and creating more focal points for citizens. Moreover, it 
highlighted the need for a partnership approach to fulfil these efforts and called for the participation 
of a series of institutions: “the involvement of all the key players —  the other EU institutions and 
bodies, the national, regional and local authorities in the Member States; European political parties; 
and the civil society”30. 
The legal framework regarding the European communication strategy falls under art. 352 
which deals with subsidiary powers of the EU. Due to the inexistence of a separate legal basis for 
communication policy in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), policies 
related to communications fall under Art. 352 which deals with subsidiary powers of the EU and 
includes contingency clauses. These clauses provide legal grounds to act accordingly to the 
objectives laid down by the treaties when the latter have provided neither the scope ratione materiae 
nor the necessary powers to achieve those objectives31. Moreover, the democratic provisions found 
under Title II of the TFEU enriches the legal framework of the communicative strategy of the EU. 
Other legal documents to bear in mind are the following:  the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which frames the need for communication as a common value of the EU; the 
articles of the TFEU regulating the European Citizens’ Initiative32: article 11(4) of the TEU; article 
24(1) of the TFEU; regulations (EU) No 211/2011 and 2019/788; rules 222 and 230 of Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedures33. 
                                                             
27 LUC VAN DEN BRANDE, “Reaching Out to EU Citizens: A New Opportunity «About us, with us, for us»”, 2017. 
28 E. LIRONI, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs Potential and Challenges of E-participation in the European 
Union Study, 2016. 
29 E. COMMISSION, White Paper on a European Communication Policy, 2006, Retrieved January 25, 2021, from 
http://www.esc.eu.int/stakeholders_forum/index_en.asp. 
30 Ibid., p. 2. 
31 K. A. ISKRA, “Communication policy | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament”, 2020, 
Retrieved January 25, 2021, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/144/communication-policy. 
32 Please see section 4: European Citizens’ Initiative 
33 A. DAVOLI, “European Citizens’ Initiative | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament”, 2020, 
Retrieved March 12, 2021, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/149/la-iniciativa-ciudadana-
europea. 
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Luc Van den Brande34 introduces the idea of “nationalising the successes and Europeanising 
the failures of the EU”. This idea reflects the decreasing level of integration that authors such as 
Allen35 pointed out and linked to an array of contrasting geopolitical positions or outlooks. The 
present paper advocates for further integration as a crucial process to create actual engagement 
between the EU and EU citizens. 
Concerns regarding miscommunications such as fake news play a pivotal role in EU 
communications. Voices such as Hanna Arendt, a German American political theorist warned of 
the dangers of miscommunications which usually lower the level of trust of the audience38. In 2018, 
83% of Europeans thought that fake news was a threat to democratic processes and 73% of internet 
users were concerned about misinformation online in the pre-election period39. 
According to the Standard Eurobarometer from Autumn 201940, more than four Europeans in 
ten tend to trust the EU (43%) and trust in the EU is nine percentage points higher than trust in 






Figure 1: How much trust you have in certain media and institutions.41 
                                                             
34 “Reaching Out to EU Citizens: A New Opportunity «About us, with us, for us»”, cit. 
35 “The Common Foreign and Security Policy”, from E.Jones, A. Menon, S. Weatherill (eds.) The Oxford Handbook 
of the European Union, Press, Oxford: Oxford University, 2012. 
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However, when examining the EU’s Eurobarometer question on whether EU citizens think 
their voices count, only 45% of EU citizens agreed on this statement in autumn 2019, after a sharp 
decrease of 11 points compared to the spring 2019 Standard Eurobarometer. 
Figure 2: To what extent you agree or disagree: my voice counts in the EU42 
17 of the member states have a majority of respondents who reckons their voices are being 
heard in the EU. However, the percentage of “Total Agree” has declined in 23 countries since 
spring 2019. It was in spring 2019 when EU elections took place, meaning that political campaigns 
must have had a positive effect on the barometers. This effect has not lasted long since in autumn 
2019 a significant decrease in the statistics can be noticed. Moreover, a combination between 
miscommunications (fake news, etc.); the communication deficit as a whole; and Brexit must have 










Figure 3: To what extent you agree or disagree: my voice counts in the EU43 
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1. Historical Evolution of EU’s Communication Strategy. 
1.1 Pre-Barroso: Top-Down Approach 
1.1.1 An Inkling of Bidirectional Communication 
 
European institutions, especially the European Commission, have always intended to provide 
information on the functioning and course of action taken by the EU. There has always been the 
willingness to create a platform for EU citizens to participate in European issues or at least 
influence EU policy in some manner. Several early documents state these intentions44. The 
reasoning behind the will to communicate are issues with transparency, openness, and the intention 
to portray the EU as a political entity rather than as an economic union45.  
During the 1960s the member states went through a remarkable transformation in terms of 
economic growth. EEC communication campaigns were pointed towards academic political and 
economic elites since the main aim was to keep the elites informed and willing to cooperate in the 
integration project. This means that there was no public communication between the EU and 
citizens of Member States since communication was perceived as an elitist dimension of the EU46.  
In its origins, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Authority had a 
Spokesman’s Group / Press and Information Service from 1953, which would later expand to the 
Joint Press and Information Service, serving the three communities47. This service targeted both 
general audiences and specialised groups. It also served the purpose of representing the 
communities at fairs and exhibitions, among others. It was not until 1967 that the Directorate-
General for Press and Information (DG X) was created48. In the 1970s communications would 
flourish as a policy field emerged within the EU. On 14 December 1973, the Copenhagen European 
Council adopted a Report on the European Identity, which would aim at spreading the sense of 
community among the EEC policies49. Up until then, the EU had gathered an array of information 
channels that were set in a purely informative communicational style. There was no established 
dialogue between the EU and its citizens but rather a unidirectional informative-only mean of 
communication. It appears that the EU took a top-down approach to communication which was not 
designed to enhance a sense of belonging among the citizens of the EEC member states. There 
were insufficient coordination and no wish for initiating proactive and communicative dialogues. 
The legitimacy of the EU among the EU citizens was at stake from the very first steps of the EEC 
as the institution was perceived as an opaque and unidirectional system50.  
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The emergence of the bidirectional communications field took place in the wake of a speech 
given by Sean Ronan, the Commission’s General Director for Information, addressed to the Public 
Relations Institute of Ireland, in November 1975. In this speech, Sean Ronan acknowledges the 
communication gaps for the first time. Ronan presented the EU institutions as “remote, intangible 
and bureaucratic”. These adjectives had never been attributed to the EU before in history. Ronan 
blamed the EU for the null chances for EU citizens to participate in the Community policy-making 
structure. The Commission acknowledged the need for a steady flow of data about EEC activities51. 
Sadly, as mentioned previously in this present paper, Canel & Luomaho52 still states in 2018 that 
the EU has not yet been able to establish a consistent communication mechanism. 
These first instances of what turned out to be the communication policy of the EU were not 
accompanied by specific documents dealing with the use of the existing information tools. Since 
the main reports dealing with communication policies were not drafted until the 1990s, the 
information tools developed up until that moment were not being regulated by a concise policy 
agenda. That is to say, information tools came before regulation. In fact, several information 
networks were established in 1963, such as the European Documentation Centres network (EDC), 
which focused on providing information and other research aids for universities. Moreover, the 
Publications Office of the European Union (Publications Office) operates from 1969, the beginning 
of the ECSC. The Publications Office is an interinstitutional body and remains today as the official 
publications department of the EU. It produces Official Journals, Bulletins and Annual Reports as 
well as a vast array of leaflets, statistics and reports as well as information for children and 
researchers53. It seems that pre-policy tools have adapted to the changing insight of the EU towards 
EU communication. The legislative framework only had to shape the pathway of these tools so 
they would follow what was once uttered by Sean Ronan in his speech to the Public Relations 
Institute of Ireland. 
The Eurobarometer, founded by Jacques-René Rabier, was launched in 1973 as a regular 
public opinion survey mechanism. In the early 1960s, Rabier put forward the idea that the EU 
should collect and gather the Europeans’ ideas, attitudes, and positions. These polls would be 
conducted with two different aims: to receive input on public opinion regarding integration and to 
assess issues taking place across national borders. These polls addressed an array of issues relating 
to the EU. The EU has observed public opinion for nearly 50 years and the Eurobarometer still 
plays a pivotal role in the communication strategy of the EU in 2021. The Eurobarometer is 
conducted twice a year and it is seen as a high-quality tool since it generates a large amount of data. 
Heavy criticism has been targeted to its methodology and its instrumentation for political 
interests54. 
The first European Parliament elections took place in 1979 and allowed EU citizens to elect 
democratically 410 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Up to then, the European 
Parliament comprised members appointed by and from national parliaments. However, the 
Parliament was not content with these appointments and threatened to take the Council to the 
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European Court of Justice. The Council finally agreed on holding the first European Parliament 
elections. In June 1979, the MEPs would be chosen by universal suffrage55. Since then, several 
referendums on EU issues have taken place. These have covered issues such as accessions, 
enlargements, and treaties. 
The end of the 1970s could be summarised as a clash between the lack of policy framework 
and a growing number of communication tools that were flourishing in the traditional top-down 
approach. In sum, the 1970s were the first approach to open the debate on public participation and 
to leave behind the role of the “passive membership” that EU citizens played. However, the nature 
of the mechanisms in place was top-down which meant that there was no room for active interaction 
between the EU and EU citizens.  
 
1.1.2 The Single European Market and the Failure of “A People’s Europe” 
 
It was not until the 1980s that the European Commission recognized information and 
communication as a pivotal priority for future actions and as a crucial tool for integration. 
Therefore, the 1980s involved the linking of communication policies with the process of 
integration. The Commission realised that the main cornerstone of European economic and 
political integration was generating consensus among EU citizens about the need for this process. 
EU citizens must back up the EU’s decisions as they ultimately are the reason for the EU to exist56. 
The historical context of the 1980s must be considered in order to grasp a comprehensive view 
of the evolution of European Communications. The 1980s were marked by the European Single 
Act (1986). The Single Act was aimed at overcoming the oil crisis (1973-1979) through the 
evolution of the customs union towards the Single Market. The Single Market was to be established 
by 31 December 1992. Moreover, the cooperation towards the signature of the Schengen agreement 
started in the 1980s. In the 1980s there was a discussion about the freedom of movement of people 
which culminated in the signature of the agreement in 1985 by the Benelux countries, Germany, 
Italy and France. The elimination of border controls would not take place until 1995 when the 
Schengen agreement came into force57. 
The EU continued its quest for a consistent communication policy throughout the 1980s. The 
decade started with the establishment of an ad hoc committee composed of representatives of the 
Head of State. This committee was created in June 1984 and was meant to carry out measures to 
enhance and foster the EEC image among the public opinion. The Committee pursued a project 
called “A People’s Europe” which aimed at building the European identity. The committee drafted 
two reports in both March and June 1985 which were proposing a series of actions to be taken in 
order to promote the visibility of all the improvements and facilities that the community gave to 
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EU citizens. It was necessary to communicate how the advancements of the European single act 
and the Schengen agreement affected the everyday lives of citizens. The present project helped in 
the simplification of rules and practises to bring the EU closer to its citizens so they could benefit 
from rights such as the three classic freedoms of movement of citizens, transport's goods and 
transport services.  
Other relevant improvements were the workers right to freely move and establish within the 
community borders or the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. It is necessary to 
emphasise the idea that the project “A People’s Europe” was meant to bring to light what the EU 
as a political union was doing for the benefit of EU citizens. “A People’s Europe” advocated for 
the active participation of the citizens in the political process which would involve adopting 
uniform procedures for the election of the European Parliament. For the first time, the right of 
petition and the establishment of a European Ombudsman was contemplated as possible future 
communication tracks. The right of petition would ensure greater transparency in the 
administration as individuals were going to be given common freedom of speech and the right of 
assembly. This process would also come along with this simplification of community law so an 
average individual could understand their rights and responsibilities as a citizen of the EU58. Sadly, 
there was never materialisation of this intended simplification of the treaties as they remain too 
difficult to be understood by an average citizen despite the efforts of the lexicography and 
terminology departments of the EU. The treaties are thought to be too long and too complicated 
for a comprehensive understanding of European law. EC institutions’ language should be plain and 
easy to understand. Only then a real dialogue could be possible. The clarification and simplification 
of treaties was important because it would lead to eliciting more public support for the integration 
process59. Bongdandy and Ehlermann60 linked simplicity to legitimacy. As they put it: 
European integration lost support, and it is widely acknowledged that one reason to be found in the lack of 
transparency of the political processes in Brussels. Not all, but some of this lack of transparency is due to 
the text of the original Treaties and of all those which have followed and amended them: provisions are 
cumbersome, hard to grasp in their meaning and generally difficult to understand in their relationship to one 
another. 61 
“A People’s Europe” also brought the adoption of a community image and identity through 
the creation and promotion of symbols such as the flag, the emblem, the anthem, and stamps. 
Finally, the project also intended to provide more information about the integration process of the 
EU. Some saw this project as a solely politically driven agenda, yet some others acknowledge the 
Commission's intent to reinforce a European identity by emphasizing the importance of integration. 
This plan was relaunched in both November 1985 and June 1986 thanks to the drafting of two new 
written communications which mainly advocated for opening to new topics such as the 
environment the social sphere and the monetary policies. The EU understood the importance of 
communication campaigns urging to promote the benefits of the internal market. Radio 
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programmes, bulletins and specific brochures on EEC policies were being launched in order to 
spread all the data that EU citizens could be taking advantage of62. As they put it, 
The clusters expanded alongside the process of integration, attracting within them knew issues. In the 1980s 
transparency was associated with simplification of administrative acts, European identity with the idea of 
citizenship, while within the cluster of issues related to organisation the principle of collaboration is 
extended to all the European institutions, not only to member states. 63 
According to authors such as Clercq64, “A People’s Europe” never fulfilled all its purposes and 
remained as a failed attempt to boost a change in European Communications. The EU did not regain 
the credibility that “A People’s Europe” promised65.  
 
1.1.3 The Ratification Crisis 
 
The public communication strategy of the EU underwent a drastic shift with the ratification of 
the Maastricht treaty. The Maastricht treaty created the EU as well as its three pillars: the European 
communities; common foreign and security policy and justice, and Home Affairs. At this point, 
European integration was not supported by ordinary EU citizens as both the Danish and French 
referenda proved in 1992. The “no” won in Denmark and only 51% of the votes were favourable 
to the ratification in France. The negative feedback received from both referenda dragged EU 
legitimacy into the spotlight. The information and communication policies were now under 
scrutiny and some raised the question of whether the current policies at the time were being 
effective or not. The main aim of public communications in a public institution is to create strong 
liaisons between the institution and the institutions’ audience. However, it seems that the EU had 
not reflected upon the connexion between legitimacy and effective communication strategies66. 
Owing to the public’s rejection of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty there was an 
ongoing debate on a presumable democratic deficit of the EU. The EU answered these accusations 
by claiming their willingness to increase the transparency of the Community. This new approach 
was captured on the Interinstitutional declaration on democracy, transparency, and subsidiarity67. 
This declaration is dated 25 October 1993 and was put forward by the Council and the European 
Parliament. This paper was a declaration of intentions which included opening some of its debates 
to the public; publishing records and explanations of its voting; and providing access to its archives, 
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among other measures. This institutional response had a clear target: to let the general public know 
that the EU was eager to get closer to them68. 
 
1.1.4 Clercq and Pinheiro 
 
The most remarkable actions were the ones led by Clercq and Pinheiro —a Member of the 
European Parliament and a Commissioner respectively— who proposed communicative strategies 
that questioned the organisational issues of the EU instead of criticising the political issues of the 
organisation. Clercq claimed that EU citizens had been “imposed” to agree with the EU as no 
referenda on the EU asked whether they agreed or not with its existence69. In March 1993 a 
Committee of Experts chaired by the MEP Clerq published the report Reflection on Information 
and Communication Policy of the European Community70. This report aimed at overcoming the 
previously mentioned organisational issues of the EU by assuming that a marketing-oriented 
approach would give results.  
The then president of the Commission Jacques Delors asked commissioner João de Deus 
Pinheiro to evaluate whether changes should apply to the information and communication spheres 
of the EU. Pinheiro thought that Clercq’s view was lacking a substantial course of action. Pinheiro 
was able to spot two main areas of concern: 
Firstly, he realised that citizens may be baffled when encountering a very complex and 
institutionalised system. This confusion could lead to scepticism. EU citizens were more 
acquainted with local governments and saw the EU as a foreign and external political entity with 
no relevance to them. Pinheiro thought that maybe EU citizens could not grasp what the universal 
approach of the EU involved as they were not acquainted with such systems. Moreover, the EU 
and its transnational approach to politics was unprepared to engage with local audiences from each 
of the member states.  
Secondly, Pinheiro blamed the Commission for the scepticism created among public audiences 
due to a lack of proper coordination and professionalism concerning communication strategies. 
Commissioner Pinheiro then claimed that openness and transparency should be acknowledged as 
the cornerstones of public communications. He also advocated for an improvement in terms of 
management of information and a reorganisation of the Commission's competencies. The 
Maastricht treaty would then recognise that public access to information and the transparency of 
the decision-making process were crucial to passing the test of public scrutiny. 
Pinheiro’s words would lead to two reports urging for openness: firstly, the Communication 
to the Council the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee71; secondly, Openness in 
the Community72. Furthermore, the Interinstitutional Declaration on Democracy Transparency and 
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Subsidiarity73 enumerated the specific measures taken by the institutions of the EU to strengthen 
openness of the policy making and convenience when accessing information. Pinheiro added that 
communication strategies should be developed on-demand and shaped to target specific audiences 
as well as easily available. Pinheiro’s report The Commission’s Information and Communication 
Policy—External Information 74 emphasizes the need for coordination of Commission’s activities, 
a clear delimitation in terms of responsibilities among the DG X, the Spokesman’s Service and the 
College of Commissioners. The paper also advocated for strong cooperation between the EU and 
the Member States. This cooperation would take place through the Commission Offices in the 
Member States. The Commission Offices should listen to the publics’ opinions of the deployment 
site to then convey them to the Commission. By doing so, Pinheiro meant consolidating the active 
participation of the public in the decision-making process of the Union. All these actions were to 
erase the public’s scepticism and haziness that commissioner João de Deus Pinheiro initially 
highlighted75. 
The mid-1990s was characterised by the entry in force of the Schengen treaty (1995). There 
was a vivid intention to enlarge the Community. The enlargement perspective would therefore 
advocate for a more flexible decision-making process. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) would 
establish an area of freedom, security, and justice for its citizens with no interior borders. In order 
to accomplish this aim, the Amsterdam treaty required member states to transfer powers from 
national governments to the European Parliament including criminal justice, common immigration 
policy, refugees’ policy and cooperation with the police. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty created 
the position of high representatives and differentiated among the common foreign and security 
policy general guidelines and the adoption of common actions, common positions, and the 
implementation of foreign policy76. This transfer of powers would be essential to create a firm 
external border of the Union77. The EU was expanding, and external borders were being 
delimitated.  
It appears that the EU cared about a political and economic expansion, yet it did not pay 
attention to solve its problems with EU-civil society communications. The pillars of the EU, the 
EU citizens, were placed at a secondary priority while the Plan Agenda 200078 was launched the 
same year as the Amsterdam Treaty. The Agenda 2000 was a strategy to reform the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Regional Policy and a declaration of intentions to reform the financial 
framework to prepare the Union for the upcoming Eastern Enlargement. I reckon that enlarging a 
Union that did not accomplish strong liaisons with the population of the member countries was not 
the right course of action. A fragmented Union in terms of public opinion should not aim for 
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enlargement if it was meant to be an integrative organisation. The internal fragmentation 
concerning communications came in 1999 when the College of Commissioners resigned when they 
were accused of fraud and corruption. This major event started a crisis of legitimation of the 
European Commission. 
 
1.1.5 The White Paper on European Governance 
 
Romano Prodi took charge of the Commission in 1999 and intended to update the 
Commission’s image and to reinforce the integration process. The White Paper Reforming the 
Commission79 and the White Paper on European Governance80 were a statement of purpose which 
gathered in two documents the general objectives and course of action of Prodi’s Commission. 
Prodi presented a strategy that involved the following steps: firstly, reorganising the Commission’s 
activities; secondly, improving governance; and finally, implementing a new communication 
policy. The White Paper on European Governance called for good governance relying on values 
such as openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. In order to meet these 
commitments, the Commission prepared an annex on consultation of European Institutions named 
Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum 
standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission81. This annex acknowledged 
that the benefits of collecting outside input were not an innovation of that period.  
However, this document proposed a joint approach involving all the European institutions to 
create a consistent undertaking to consultations. Moreover, it urged for a more transparent 
consultation process which would increase the Commission’s accountability. Furthermore, this 
annex included the Interactive Policy-Making Initiative (IPM) as a policy to introduce the Internet 
as a tool to collect and analyse data, which would allow for a quicker and more accurate response 
to EU citizens. The Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society (CONECCS) was 
also introduced as the database for all formal and structured consultative bodies. It was a channel 
of information between civil society organisations and the Commission. A vast range of civil 
society organisations can speak up to CONNECCS such as the Assembly of European Regions 
(AER) or Caritas Europa, among others. Thanks to this annex, the use of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) was linked to democracy as a participatory tool for the 
masses and the EU’s overall discourse defended EU democratization. 
Up until that time, the numerous declarations and reports on communication and information 
policies never called for the active collaboration between the EU Member States and the Union. 
However, in 2001, the EU acknowledged for the very first time the role played by the Member 
States when spreading information on EU issues. The document containing this intention was the 
Commission communication on a new framework for cooperation on activities concerning the 
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information and communication policy of the European Union, dated 29 June 200182. The 
document referred to Article 10 of the EC Treaty which obliges the administrations of the Member 
States to take the necessary measures to facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. The 
participation of the Member States in a common European Information and communication policy 
was now considered of fundamental importance83. 
In March 2002, the European Parliament adopted another report calling for an improvement 
in terms of EU information policies and a more developed communication strategy. One more 
report on the same lines was adopted in July 2002 yet the lack of support showed in the ratification 
of the Maastricht treaty was still a huge problem for the EU. A series of reports and initiatives were 
followed yet the lack of two-way communication was still a widespread problem in the EU84. 
 
1.1.6 The Treaty of Nice and The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
The Treaty of Nice came into force in 2001. Its objective was to adapt the decision-making 
processes of the EU for the enlargement. It turned out to be a very technical treaty about issues 
such as how voting in the council would work after the enlargement; how to weigh votes depending 
on the size of the population85. In the fields of communications, the EU succeeded to take one step 
forward when adopting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Articles relevant for the field of 
EU communications are the following: Article 11 (right to information and freedom of expression 
as well as freedom and diversity of the media); Article 41 (right to be heard and right of access to 
documents relating to oneself); Article 42 (right of access to the documents of the EU institutions) 
and Article 44 (right of petition)86.  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights paved the way to the 
audience-centred approach that Barroso will adopt during his first Commission. 
The Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union87 put forward the idea that Europe 
was at a crossroads and had to face challenges such as the following: an improvement of the 
division of competencies; the simplification of the Union’s instruments; the enhancement of 
democracy, transparency and efficiency; and the writing of a constitution for EU’s citizens88. 
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1.2 First Barroso Commission (2004-2009): An Audience-Centric Approach 
 
The two major events of the First Barroso Commission were the following: the low turnout 
from the 2004 European Parliament and the failure of the European Constitution. 
The European Parliament elections held in June 2004 were another example of how EU 
citizens were not interested in EU issues. The low participation in those elections could be 
interpreted as a dearth of interest towards the EU. However, as Schmitt et al. claim90, there is no 
direct correlation between low participation in an election and EU scepticism or opposition towards 
either EU institutions or EU policies. According to these authors, low participation does not equal 
a legitimacy crisis. 
 
1.2.1 The Failure of the European Constitution 
 
Barroso’s Commission opted for promoting integration in the shape of the project of writing a 
European constitution. A treaty can only enter in force if it is ratified by all member states. 
Ratification in each country depends on its constitutional arrangements and political processes. 
Two referenda took place in France and the Netherlands. Both referenda rejected the ratification 
of the European Constitution. According to Hobolt & Brouard’s findings91, French voters made use 
of this referendum as a channel to convey their opinion on how they wanted the EU to evolve. On 
the other hand, in the Netherlands, the votes against the ratification seemed to translate into 
concerns about multiculturalism and loss of national identity92.  
The widespread “no” from both referendums in France and the Netherlands and the failure of 
its ratification were the two vivid examples of the lack of communicative channels between the EU 
and its citizens. Many argued that the Constitutional Treaty failed since integration has to go hand 
in hand with wide public support. There was no active involvement of the citizens of Europe; EU 
citizens were not able to set any sort of agenda nor participate in any stage of the writing of the 
constitution. As Wallström93 puts it, the European constitution could have been a success only if 
there had been an active two-way communication channel between the institutions of the EU and 
its citizens. EU institutions drafted the Joint Statement on the results of the referendum in the 
Netherlands on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe94. This statement claimed that the 
EU respected the choices made by the voters in both France and the Netherlands. However, the 
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Statement also conveyed that the EU was still convinced of the viability of the European 
Constitution95.  
This is a vivid example of how communicative tools such as referenda were being politicised 
and instrumentalised to support political decisions. In this case, the referenda did not result 
favourable to what the UE wanted to accomplish. Therefore, the results of the referenda were 
ignored.  On the other hand, there was also a poor implementation of the plan to outsource 
consultations to member states. As mentioned before, the Commission communication on a new 
framework for cooperation on activities concerning the information and communication policy of 
the European Union96 externalised consultations to member states. However, many states did not 
undergo this referendum and those which took place did not do it at the same point in time, some 
states chose to do it on different dates. This difference in time could have biased the results. In 
sum, there is a need to weigh the political problems and the communication problems of the EU as 
those responsible for the other may blame the other party. 
As a result of the tense situation decided to create a new commissioner for communication 
since he felt that those elections reflected the communication crisis that the EU was undergoing. 
The commissioner appointed for this position was the former environment commissioner Margot 
Wallström97. Owing to the failing constitution, the President of the Commission, José Barroso, and 
Vice-President Wallström presented a strategic plan to shift the communicative plan of the 
European Commission. From 2005, communication policy became a binding institutional 
priority98. 
The new commissioner for communication, Margot Wallström, acknowledged from a 
communications point of view that the failure of ratification meant that there would have to be a 
greater internal dialogue within the Commission itself in order to update internal communications 
within the institutions. The failing constitution created a climax of political uncertainty which also 
translated into very poor liaisons between the EU and the EU citizens. Wallström gave a speech at 
the CIRCOM Conference at the Committee of the Regions99 presenting what would turn out to be 
one of the first relevant policy papers on communications: The Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue 
and Debate100.  
The CIRCOM Conference at the Committee of the Regions was the turning point for the EU 
communication strategy because after presenting all these arguments and reasonings behind the 
next actions of the EU, the commissioner presented what would turn out to be the two most 
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important reports on EU communication: the Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate101 and 
the White Paper on Communication and Democracy in Europe102. 
 
1.2.2 The Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 
 
At the conference, the commissioner for communication acknowledged the huge need for a 
new communication strategy. The commissioner pointed out three main issues that Plan D would 
tackle. Those were the following: firstly, the urge for better communication between EU 
institutions and EU citizens; the need to “go local”; and thirdly, improving and promoting the 
working relations between the Commission and the regional media. As far as the first aim is 
concerned, the commissioner listed for the very first time, issues concerning people in an official 
report. As Wallström103 enumerates them: 
People want the European Union to deal with such issues as: 
 Unemployment – which many see as a negative effect of globalisation; 
 The pensions and healthcare “time-bomb” as Europe's workforce shrinks; 
 The need for better education and training; 
 Climate change and other environmental issues.104 
 
The commissioner also pointed out that there were many global issues that people simply did 
not have an inkling about and that there should be a clear declaration of intentions to connect EU 
citizens with current global issues that may affect them. He added the need to identify what people 
do not know about EU affairs in order to fill these gaps. Making contact, listening and dialogue 
were the three cornerstones that Wallström highlighted. When it comes to the second issue 
acknowledged in the Plan D report, the need to go local, Wallström advocated for the urge to bridge 
both local and regional media. The EU needs to convey how EU actions are making a difference 
in the daily lives of local communities.  
Wallström provides very interesting examples of this local range of the EU. For instance, he 
states how in South Eastern Ireland the EU has provided funds to help young mothers living in 
suburbs or poor neighbourhoods by providing childcare facilities. Thanks to these childcare 
facilities these women could then attend training courses. Another example was that the EU 
funding worked to ensure that buses were to be adapted for handicapped people and warranted the 
possibility to get on taxis with no extra cost and short notice for handicapped people. According to 
Wutz105, all these intentions to go local were undermined by the middleman figure of national 
politicians. One cannot avoid wondering whether the main problem was found in the national 
lenses (distorting or deviating the good intentions of the EU) or if the EU’s proposals were just 
empty promises. 
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Commissioner Wallström claimed that neither of these papers were an attempt to bring back 
the European Constitution. These were communication papers that only aimed at public legitimacy 
with no hidden intentions to bring back the already refused constitution. The Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate106 proposes 13 initiatives at the community level aiming at the 
strengthening of dialogue, public debate and citizens’ participation. The initiatives converged into 
a new “feedback process” approach in which results would be forwarded to the Commission and 
Council by each Member State. The following are the initiatives of The Plan D for Democracy, 
Dialogue and Debate107: 
 visits by Commissioners to Member states in order to stimulate direct contact with 
citizens. These would take the form of debates involving governments, national 
parliaments, business and trade union leaders, civil society, students and regional and 
local authorities. 
 individual Commissioners should be accessible and ready to take on national parliaments 
to explain Commission policies as well as to make practical arrangements. 
 reinforcing the role of the Commission Representations in order to let citizens know that 
these are focal points to create the cherished two-way communication channel. 
 stimulating the creation of European Round Tables for democracy. 
 hosting a series of regionally-based events with “European Goodwill Ambassadors”. 
These would mirror the United Nations model for which household names from each 
member state would be invited to hold open meetings, workshops and talks on EU 
concerns. 
 to promote further the existing consultation procedures. 
 to acknowledge and promote the discussion of specific policy areas proposed by the 
European Citizens’ Panel. 
 the launch of the European Transparency Initiative. For instance, the Seville European 
Council opted for opening the Council meetings to the citizens when the Council acts as 
a co-legislator. 
 to look for ways to increase participation in future European referenda or elections, by 
paying specific attention to the young population as well as to minority groups. 
 to present a Eurobarometer survey on the future of Europe and focusing on public 
support for EU policies and actions. 
 to make use of technology and the Internet in order to promote the EU and generate 
debate online. 
 the views of young people should play a pivotal role in the EU. 
The “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate” was full of good intentions and positive 
prospects. This report symbolised the foundations of a top-down approach to communication. 
However, authors such as Biegón108 claim that there is a gap between what is stated in Plan D and 
the execution of the initiatives listed above. As Yang109 puts it, the participatory tools of the EU 
resulted largely disappointing as there was a contradiction between what EU reports aimed at and 
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the actual initiative. There were failures in terms of the organisational aspects of the forums and 
very little attention was paid to the design and the execution of those events. Furthermore, these 
events were not advertised widely, so their public recognition was poor. Ivic110 went one step 
further and stated that Plan D did not reach its very basic purpose: to include European citizens in 
the decision-making process in the EU. The proof is that the Treaty of Lisbon was ratified without 
the open debates that Plan D insisted upon. Citizens were excluded from the drafting of this treaty 
and this fact completely contradicts Plan D. Plan D only achieved the conduction of periodic open 
debates but with no substantive change since debates did not evolve into deliberations. Another 
problem pointed out by Bruell111 was the definition of “public sphere” in the Plan D report. 
According to the Plan D report, the “public sphere” is linked to regional divisions. However, this 
is not the case since there is no existing relationship between a public sphere and a specific 
territorial division. This idea contradicts the open dialogue that Plan D advocated for which was 
expected to transcend borders and any kind of boundaries for public debates. There is no room for 
heterogenous projects where all voices should be heard and, therefore, Plan D was even considered 
a propagandistic tool of the EU112. 
 
1.2.3 White Paper on a European Communication Policy 
 
In February 2006 the Commission presented the White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy113. This is considered to be the second and most important document on European 
communications strategy history. The Commission realised that the success of The Plan D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate114 depended on a partnership approach. Plan D failed due to a 
dearth of cooperation among the different key players. The White Paper advocated for a partnership 
of EU institutions and bodies with the national and regional authorities in the member states 
European as well as political parties and civil society. However, this partnership approach was 
already on the table when the EU introduced Plan D. The explanation behind the White Paper on 
European Communication Policy115 was while Plan D was just the starting point of the 
communications debate, The White Paper targeted the drafting of a new communication strategy 
as such. 
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The White Paper on a European Communication Policy116 was followed by a communication 
issued by the Commission Communicating Europe in Partnership in October 2007117. The result 
of these two documents was a joint declaration of the three EU institutions, the Joint Declaration 
on Communicating Europe in Partnership118 which took place in October 2008. The objectives of 
the White Paper on European Communication Policy combine the aims of Plan D with practical 
applications to reach these aims.  
The White Paper on a European Communication Policy119 was the official proposal to define 
a legal base for the communication policy of the EU and to declare it a common policy per se. The 
objectives were the following: 
 to establish an interinstitutional agreement in order to improve cooperation with member 
states on communication issues. This framework would allow for a more coherent and 
overarching plan to reach European citizens. 
 to set a partnership comprised of all key actors involved: member states, regional bodies, 
NGOs, enterprises and representatives of civil society. The White Paper called for the 
intervention of The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions to incentivise regional debates on European issues. Multilingualism is 
described as an integral aspect of the legitimacy, transparency and democracy of the EU 
 improving civic education at school on the EU and its policy. 
 the adoption of the Citizens for Europe programme aiming at helping European citizens 
run transnational projects. 
 reinforcing the i2010 Initiative which sought to close the information gap as well as to 
address ICT skills since they were the new channels for communication on European 
issues. 
 the proposal of Euro Info Centres and Innovation Relay Centres as possible points of 
access of information. 
 updating the methodology for the Eurobarometer and strengthen the system if possible. 
The Herrero Report120 heavily criticised the White Paper on a European Communication Policy 
because it focused on consolidating old proposals rather than defining new ones. The Commission 
ended up abandoning the major proposals which represented the failure of the White Paper. In the 
Herrero Report121, Herrero explicitly refuses the White Paper on behalf of the Members of the 
European Parliament122. 
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The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009. The treaty of Lisbon was the result of 
the negative outcome of the Constitutional Treaty and it was adopted after the two-year period of 
reflection that the EU established in order to rethink the treaties. The political impasse lasted from 
2005 to 2007. During this period, Merkel advocated for the business-as-usual style of the EU: what 
is known as the “classic community summit style”. Decisions would not be open to journalists as 
it was before since the EU felt broken after the rejection of the European Constitution. Decision-
making processes would again take place behind closed doors, and this fact would evolve to the 
substitution of the former bottom-up approach of the EU. This was an enormous setback for the 
communication strategy of the EU as the organisation had never considered closing its doors to the 
public nor giving up the audience-approach tendency that was reflected in the array of reports cited 
in this paper. This thought persisted in time during the reflection period and would be reinforced 
with the problems of ratification that the Treaty of Lisbon would undergo123. 
Among the 15 EU Member States of that time, Ireland was the only Member State to hold a 
referendum. In June 2008, the Irish voters rejected the Treaty of Lisbon due to a campaign focused 
on the loss of tax privileges that this treaty would mean for the Irish. Some argued that these reforms 
were necessary since they were to bring delimitation of competencies of the EU: exclusive 
competencies, shared competencies and supported competencies. The Lisbon Treaty introduced 
several changes such as the abolition of the three-pillar structure; the HR acquired new 
responsibilities; the establishment of the European External Action Service and the inclusion of the 
solidarity clause124. 
The European Constitution was meant to bring the EU closer to EU citizens, yet the results of 
the referenda indicated that the intentions of the EU had had the opposite effect. Since the EU 
insisted on putting forward their project, they brought back the European Constitution into the 
Treaty of Lisbon and other legal texts. The EU scattered the European Constitution and led its way, 
showing no interest in the EU citizens’ wishes. 
 
1.3 Second Barroso Commission (2009-2014) Back-to-Business: Top-Down 
Approach 
 
This phase was marked by both the economic crisis of 2008 and the setback in the 
communication strategy of the EU. The financial crisis or mortgage crisis, defined as a “severe 
contraction of liquidity in global financial markets” took place due to the collapse of the US 
housing market125. 
The 2008 economic crisis together with the failing constitution led to the re-establishment of 
the old top-down approach that the EU had abandoned in the 70s. The European Parliament 
elections from 2009 added to the legitimation crisis that the EU was undergoing as there was an 
increase in electoral abstention reaching levels similar to the ones in 1979. Abstention levels 
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reached 57% while participation was only represented by 43% of the electorate126.  The DG 
Communications’ polls showed that the two key worrying issues for the European citizens were 
both economic growth and unemployment. These polls reflect the instability that the 2008 crisis 
involved. 
After the failure to ratify the European Constitution, the EU opted for a partial cessation of 
communication with the public. This was an attempt to reintroduce the intergovernmental model 
in order to give some sense of institutionalisation after the constitutional crisis. This was thought 
to be the only feasible option to hold the EU together127. The public’s opinion was no longer the 
priority. During the second Barroso Commission, the communication strategy of the EU took a 
unidirectional approach in a purely informative style. The most relevant opinion was the 
Commission’s opinion and the European citizens were perceived as second-class opinions. Viviane 
Reding, the newly appointed European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and 
Citizenship, introduced the corporate communication system in order to grant the Commission a 
more pivotal role in Communications.  
The Corporate communication under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020128 
acknowledges the financial and economic crisis and states that the context presented unprecedented 
challenges for the communication strategy of the EU. The main aim of that paper was to announce 
that a new legal basis would be implemented in terms of communications and those would be made 
operational in order to establish strong corporate communication. This was the first time that 
corporate communication was implemented in this manner for the Commission. The pilot phase 
for the implementation of the corporate model would take place in 2014. The main aim for this 
corporate communication strategy was to debate on the future of Europe, placing the European 
Parliament elections in the centre of the dialogue. Enhancing the image of the EU in those times of 
particular hardship for the public opinion of the EU129. 
Even though this new focus was vertical, unidirectional communication which reminds of the 
70s tendency, this new approach to communication did not leave behind the measures implemented 
why the White Paper on a European Communication Policy130. The corporate model was meant to 
add to measures implemented by the White Paper such as the citizen dialogues and the online tools 
to establish this two-way cherished channel. 
There was a clash between the overall aim of this period with the rise of technologies. It was 
during this period that online communications tools developed and created new online platform. 
The public eye believes in these new ways of communication, leaving old communication channels 
as secondary tools. The existing social demand for more legitimacy and transparency led towards 
the comeback of the bottom-up approach. The wall between EU citizens and the EU had to collapse 
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and the two-way communication style had to play the crucial role that had always played in the EU 
from the 70s onwards. 
Following the clash between the overall strategy and the rise of Internet tools, in 2011, the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) was created131. This is one of the most important participatory 
instruments in EU democracy as it is supported by a consistent legal basis: article 11(4) of the TEU; 
article 24(1) of the TFEU; regulations (EU) No 211/2011 and 2019/788; rules 222 and 230 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedures. The proposal to create the ECI was a round of consultations, the 
Green Paper on a European Citizens’ Initiative132. On 15 December 2010, a political arrangement 
was reached, and the official text was adopted by the Parliament and the Council on 16 February 
2011. Despite the efforts mentioned, owing to technical adaptation in each Member states to set a 
streamlined verification process, the ECI did not start working until a year later. Ever since 
implementation, there the Commission has expressed its willingness to present reports on the ECI 
Regulation. The first report European Citizens’ Initiative – First lessons of implementation133 
suggested a series of recommendations to overcome the initial challenges of the ECI. For instance, 
to create an office and online platform to support the requests; to provide further feedback on 
refusal or acceptance of the proposals; to clarify is ECI can propose amendments to EU primary 
law, among other proposals. 
 
1.4 Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-2019) Back to an Audience-Centric Approach 
 
The political context in Juncker’s Commission was the following: the remains of the 2008 
crisis; the success of the Brexit referendum; the rise of populism; the refugees’ crisis and Trump’s 
presidential victory. Moreover, there was also a rise of populist parties in the European elections 
in 2014. In 2015, President Juncker uttered one of the quotes that set the main political 
communicative aim for this period: “This is not the time for business as usual”134. Not only did 
Juncker call for a new approach to EU politics but he also targeted the issue of the asylum policy 
by explicitly asking for efforts towards the establishment of asylum and refugee policy135. 
Moreover, Juncker advocated for a fair deal with Britain as well as to work on a robust and binding 
global climate deal136. In Juncker’s words, “Europe needs more solidarity and courage”137.  
The historical context of EU communications was marked by the crisis from the second 
Barroso Commission. The second Barroso Commission regressed to top-down approaches to 
communications despite keeping some of the audience-centric strategies from the first Barroso 
Commission. Juncker would then reverse the effect of the general trend of the Barroso Commission 
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by redirecting the whole communicative strategy back to the audience-centric approach by 
emphasising both the use of online technologies and public debates138. 
Juncker’s Commission was aware of the institutional, political, and economic weaknesses of 
the EU and its Member States. In order to establish a solid Economic and Monetary Union, Juncker 
aimed at 10 political priorities139:  
a new boost for jobs, growth and investment; a connected digital single market; a resilient energy union with a 
forward-looking climate change policy; a deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base; a 
deeper and fairer economic and monetary union; a balanced and progressive trade policy to harness globalisation; 
an area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust; a new policy on migration; a stronger global 
actor; a union of democratic change. 140 
The ten political priorities did not tackle communications explicitly because Juncker aimed at 
creating liaisons between politics and communications. The Juncker Commission left behind the 
idea that communication was a separate strategy and proceeded to integrate it into the political 
sphere. Juncker thought that this would be a way to improve the e-participation tools that ensured 
two-way communicative channels141. It would appear that this is a good strategy to capture the 
attention of the audiences: instead of focusing on the legal or institutional aspects of the Union 
when communicating, the EU considered the ten priorities as the main topics to communicate. This 
way, the EU would stop communicating about decision-making topics that were perceived as too 
bureaucratic and detached from everyday lives. Instead, the EU would communicate on the ten 
priorities which mirrored the priorities of the EU citizens in the Eurobarometer from 2014142. The 
following were the top priorities of this Eurobarometer: Economic situation, Unemployment, the 
state of Member States public finances, etc. 
 
                                                             
138 DG COMMUNICATION, Strategic Plan 2016-2020. DG Communication, 2016. 
139 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, The Juncker Commission’s ten priorities - State of play in early 
2018: in depth analysis, 2018, p. 3, Retrieved March 27, 2021, from https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/cb5248c4-0639-11e8-b8f5-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
140 Ibid. 
141 DG COMMUNICATION, Strategic Plan 2016-2020. DG Communication, cit. 
142 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Standard Eurobarometer 81 Spring 2014 Public Opinion in the European Union First 
Results, 2014., 2014, Retrieved March 27, 2021,from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. 
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Figure 4: What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?143 
The novelty of this period is the direct dependency between the Directorate General of 
Communications and the presidency of the Commission. Juncker was to become the president 
directly in charge of the Directorate General of Communications. The communication from the 
president to the Commission: Communication à la Commission relative aux méthodes de travail 
de la Commission144 was the result of a new collegial structure which would place the Spokesperson 
Service (SPP) under President Juncker. The SPP would support President Juncker in the overall 
goal of achieving effective communication in the media with EU citizens. The figure of the SPP is 
important because it still aimed at top-down approaches to communications as it was mainly 
informative and persuasive information, targeting the improvement of the image of the EU. The 
communicative baggage of the second Barroso Commission was still latent at the time. However, 
it would appear that the EU understood the pivotal role of traditional means of communication to 
reach the EU population. The bureaucratic side of the EU felt comfortable with this means of 
communication. Therefore, communication with the regional media was enhanced despite its 
flaws. 
 This top-down tendency ended when Jean-Claude Juncker asked his special adviser, Luc Van 
den Brande, to issue a report on EU communications. The report was titled Reaching Out to EU 
Citizens: A New Opportunity ‘About us, with us, for us’145. This report represents the emblem of 
the current EU strategy. Van der Brande’s report introduced a clear audience-centric approach to 
communications. 
                                                             
143 Ibid. 
144 D. S. SECRETARIAT-GENERAL, TEXTE EN Communication à la Commission relative aux méthodes de travail de 
la Commission Communication de M. le PRESIDENT PROCÉDURE ORALE, 2015. 
145 LUC VAN DEN BRANDE, “Reaching Out to EU Citizens: A New Opportunity «About us, with us, for us»”, cit. 
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Van der Brande made relevant claims regarding the results of the 2014 elections as he 
connected the concerning rising results of populist parties with the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes 
of the electorate. As Van den Brande puts it146, 
Political analysis of recent election results suggests that a significant proportion of voters worry deeply 
about the domestic effects of EU membership, as they perceive their lives to be in the hands of an ‘alien’ 
ruler. As a result, the Union’s delivery, democracy and destiny — all of which are strongly interrelated — 
are being questioned like never before. The EU needs to redouble its efforts to earn renewed legitimacy in 
the eyes of the European electorate.147 
Van der Brande’s main statement is a call to “winning hearts and minds” which would be 
based on an “emotional engagement” with the Union148. He states that there is not enough with a 
mere acknowledgement of the Union or with the acceptance of its existence, yet an active emotional 
engagement is necessary for this two-way communication to take place. The EU tends to present 
itself as a rational entity based on objective facts and figures and avoids any sort of referents to 
emotions. The lack of explicit reference to emotions is presented as the death of the connection 
between young EU citizens and the EU. According to Van der Brande, the EU must speak and 
appeal to their emotions. This is the case because politics have a strong emotional component. 
Despite this call for emotional engagement, Van der Brande warns that this is not a call for populist 
claims not for propaganda but a call to build new bridges with this new strategy149. 
The citizen-focused and citizen-owned Europe presented by Van der Brande advocated for the 
emphasis on online tools. Van der Brande expressed his awareness of the changing communication 
habits of the EU citizens as there is a generational gap. While traditional means of communication 
—enhanced by the actions of the Spokesperson Service —were mainly used by people aged 55 and 
over; for those aged under 40 the Internet was their main data source150.  
It appears that since the EU wants to target young audiences, the institution decided to promote 
Von der Brande’s audience-centric approach rather than the top-down strategy initiated by the 
Spokesperson Service. Unidirectional approaches seem to work better with older ages while 
younger ages lean towards unidirectional approaches because they understand the bidirectional 
nature that e-participation tools have. In sum, this is the reasoning behind the overall trend of 
Juncker’s Commission to advocate for an audience-centric approach, which is contemporary with 
current changes in customer satisfaction. 
Finally, the strategic plan 2016-2020 mentions an array of tools that were enhanced throughout 
Juncker’s Commission, emphasizing the Citizen’s Dialogues. The report emphasised the 
importance of the Citizen’s Dialogues as an interactive tool that allows citizens to speak up. More 
importantly, Juncker manifests its willingness to further integrate the citizens’ opinions into the 
decision-making process. Data from April 2019 extracted from the report Citizen’s Dialogues and 
Citizen’s Consultations. Key Conclusions151 claims that Juncker’s Commission led to 1,572 
citizens’ dialogues which took place in about 583 locations. This is a significant improvement 
compared to the data from years prior. Other communicative tools were considered to play an 
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increasingly important role at national levels. For instance, European networks, the representations 
in member states and Europe Direct Information Centres (EDICs). 
 
1.5 Ursula von der Leyen (2019-2024) Audience-Centric Approach 
 
Ursula Von der Leyen came into office in December 2019, the first woman to be in charge of 
the presidency of the European Commission. The historical context of this era encompasses the 
negotiations for Brexit; the 2019 impeachment of Donald Trump and the outbreak of the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
In December 2019, Ursula von der Leyen issued the report A Union that Strives for More. My 
Agenda for Europe152. In this paper, von der Leyen presented her six headline ambitions for her 
Commission. Those were the following: “the European Green Deal; an economy striving for social 
fairness and prosperity; a Europe fit for the digital age within safe and ethical boundaries; 
protecting the European way of life and values; a stronger Europe in the world and a new push for 
European democracy”153. According to the Strategic Plan 2020-2024 of the Directorate General of 
Communication, these priorities are the centre of attention of DG Communications. However, this 
report already included the impact of the COVID-19 crisis and claims that a corporate 
communication campaign for the Recovery Plan for Europe is currently being implemented: 
NextGenerationEU. This corporate communication campaign is aimed at both the COVID-19 
effects and the enhancement of the European Green Deal and the digital transition. 
Ursula von der Leyen aims at lengthening the audience-centric approach established by 
Juncker. Her statements regarding the communication strategy back up this audience-centric 
tendency: “I want to strengthen the link between people and the institutions that serves them, to 
narrow the gap between expectation and reality and to communicate about what Europe is doing”; 
“Europeans must have a say on how their Union is run and what it delivers on. This is why I believe 
we need a Conference on Europe”. 
Not only von der Leyen herself but also the DG Communication statement included in the 
Strategic Plan 2020-2024 points towards a top-down approach. The DG communication is the 
following: “Listen – Advise – Engage DG COMM, as a corporate communication service, brings 
Europe closer to its citizens.” Furthermore, specific objective 5 from this report urges to create 
platforms for citizens to directly connect with the EU through face-to-face events or online events. 
It is still too early to see the results of von der Leyen’s efforts towards European 
communications, especially due to the changes that the COVID-19 outbreak has had on both the 
Commission as such and on the DG for Communications. Despite the uncertain times of this period, 
it appears that von der Leyen will make top-down communications linger within the DG of 
communications, maintaining the actions started by Juncker’s Commission. 
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1.6 Main Takeaways 
 
The historical background presented in this paper has shown that there is a clear correlation 
between negative results from European parliamentary elections or referenda and a change in the 
communication strategy of the EU. The evolution of the communication strategy of the EU has 
involved fluctuations between top-bottom approaches and bottom-up strategies. The events 
triggering these changes have been the following: Firstly, the ratification crisis of the Maastricht 
Treaty resulted in the White Paper on Communication and Democracy in Europe154. The problems 
with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty changed the informative unidirectional scope of EU 
communications into the bidirectional approach once enunciated by Sean Ronan in his speech to 
the Public Relations Institute of Ireland. However, the ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty 
and the economic crisis in 2008 meant a setback for EU communications. The EU excluded the 
bottom-up approach accomplished back in 2006 with the White Paper and regressed to a top-down 
approach. However, the European Citizen’s Initiative followed, together with the comeback of the 
audience-centric approach led by Juncker’s Commission. Von der Leyen is perpetuating this 
tendency and strengthening it. 
The two main takeaways that this paper wants to highlight are the following:  
 It appears that the EU should avoid the regression to top-down approaches since it goes 
against principles of public scrutiny and accountability. Providing a pivotal role in 
communications to the Commission while relegating the public view’s as second class 
opinions is a strategy contrary to the most recent Commissions. Actions taken by 
Juncker and von der Leyen have been proven to be effective. Therefore, it appears that 
top-down approaches should be avoided.  
 It seems that the EU is still paving the way to the full implementation of the current 
audience-centric approach. The EU is yet to achieve full implementation of this current 
communication strategy. Von der Leyen is expected to further develop the European 
bottom-up approach to communications. 
 
1.7 A Word on Vulnerability 
 
This section aims at highlighting the importance of acknowledging vulnerability as an intrinsic 
element of an international organisation. If an organisation is not able to embrace a possible future 
failure, this may result in on-demand shifts from top-down approaches to bottom-up approaches 
and vice-versa. Shifting the approach can be interpreted as a means to control the situation, leaving 
aside the feedback provided by EU citizens in referenda or elections. This essay reckons that this 
could have been the situation during the regression to the bottom-up approach during the second 
Barroso Commission. The Barroso Commission did now acknowledge the negative public 
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response to the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, Barroso solely shifted the approach to 
communications to a top-down approach, disregarding the views of EU citizens. 
Following Steve Job’s model155, not only are start-ups design to adapt, change and create 
according to the feedback from their customers; start-ups are designed to accept vulnerability as 
part of a consequence of this willingness to be accountable to the public eye.  
Vulnerability is not often seen as part of the values of a company as it is perceived as a 
synonym for weakness. However, vulnerability and courage are two sides of the same coin because 
a company cannot put their product out in the market without accepting that failure could take 
place. A company should be ready to accept judgement and criticism since that is what taking risks 
entails. There is no courage without vulnerability. As Brené Brown156 puts it, “Vulnerability is the 
birthplace of innovation, creativity and change.”; “Vulnerability is not about winning. it’s not about 
losing. It’s having the courage to show up when you can’t control the outcome”. 
The EU has always wanted to control the outcome of its communication strategy. Whenever 
the EU communication strategy in place would not give the expected results, the EU would shift 
from top-down approaches to bottom-up approaches on demand. The EU should not present itself 
as a vulnerable institution, yet it should acknowledge that is open to process failure. Institutional 
vulnerability would involve sticking to the already effective strategy instead of engaging in endless 
fluctuations between top-down approaches and bottom-up approaches.  
These fluctuations mainly took place when either parliamentary elections or referenda took 
place in the EU. The ratification crisis of the Maastricht Treaty led the EU to shift from top-down 
vertical approaches to communication to two-way bottom-up communications. This was a positive 
shift as communication theories advocate for bottom-up approaches. However, it was during the 
ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty that the EU shifted back to the top-down approach to 
communications. This could be read as the failure to acknowledge vulnerability and failure as a 
positive driving power towards enhancing top-down communications. Instead of understanding 
that failure is part of the nature of a political institution and embracing failure as a formative 
experience, the EU decided to regress to the old bureaucratic, institutional and traditional top-down 
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2. Legal Framework of the European Communication Strategy 
 
This section presents the possibility that the legal framework regarding European values and 
communications —comprised in both the TEU and TFU— only allows for an audience-centric 
approach for European communications.  
 
2.1 The Treaty on European Union 
 
Due to the inexistence of a separate legal basis for communication policy in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), policies related to communications fall under Art. 352 
which deals with subsidiary powers of the EU and includes contingency clauses. These clauses 
provide legal grounds to act accordingly to the objectives laid down by the treaties when the latter 
have provided neither the scope ratione materiae nor the necessary powers to achieve those 
objectives157. 
On the one hand, the Treaty on European Union158 consolidates its democratic values in its 
articles 9,10,11 and 12. Article 9 presents the provisions on democratic principles and states: “the 
Union shall observe the principle of equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from 
its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.”159 Once this principle of equality is presented, article 
10.3 states that EU citizens have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, and 
adds that the decision-making process should happen as openly and closely to the citizen as 
possible. Article 10.4 claims that political parties should contribute to enhancing political 
awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the EU. Article 11.1 mentions the importance 
of publicly exchange view between citizens and representative associations. Article 11.2 highlights 
words such as “open, transparent and regular” to describe the dialogue between representative 
associations and civil society. Article 11.3 encourages carrying out public consultations to ensure 
the coherence and transparency of the Union. Article 11.4 gives way to submit proposals to the 
European Commission on any action required for implementing the Treaties. 
The audience-centric approach appears to be the sole approach enabling open, transparent and 
regular participation from the civil society. The presented provisions on democratic principles do 
not explicitly mention the words “top-down approach” nor “audience-centric approach”; however, 
it appears that in order to comply with articles 9; 10.3; 10.4; 11.1; 11.2; 11.3 and 11.4, EU’s 
communication strategy should remain audience-centred. 
It seems that top-down approaches would not attain this open democratic dialogue as its 
vertical structure does not allow for the proactive communicative dialogues enounced in the Treaty 
on European Union. Top-down approaches could be outdated in this sense as it is a strategy based 
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on a hierarchical structure where the public views are relegated and perceived as second-class 
opinions. 
In sum, it seems that in order to comply with the provisions on democratic principles 
comprised in the Treaty on European Union, external bottom-up communications should remain 
in force and any regression to hierarchical-based communications should be avoided. 
 
2.2 Principles and Values of Good Governance 
 
The core values of the EU comprise several principles such as the enhancement of economic, 
social and territorial cohesion; and the promotion of peace, the respect for human dignity and 
human rights, democracy, freedom, equality, and the rule of law, among others160.  
One of its main principles is the following: the improvement of the transparency and 
democratic value of the European institutions. In order to fulfil this value, the EU encourages 
European citizens to contribute to EU democracy by providing their views on EU policies161. 
The Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion published in 2017 the 
report Quality of Public Administration. A Toolbox for Practitioners162. This report elaborates on 
the transparency and democratic principle of the EU. 
 
2.3 Other Relevant Provisions from the TEU 
 
Although the Lisbon Treaty does not refer to communication policies as such, it does make 
references to participatory democracy and civil dialogues. The Lisbon Treaty’s preamble urges to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the Union. Legitimacy in the public eye is one of the main challenges 
that the EU is facing regarding its communication strategies. In order to enhance such legitimacy, 
a series of e-participation instruments were laid down in order to improve EU citizens 
involvement163. Examples of those e-participation instruments are the following: The European 
Citizens’ Initiative; Citizens’ Dialogues; The Learning Corner; EU in my region, among others164. 
Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) emphasises the importance of the efforts to give 
citizens and representatives associations the chance to publicly express their views in all areas of 
                                                             
160 EUROPA.EU, “The EU in brief | European Union”, 2021, Retrieved March, 30 2021, from 
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the EU’s action165. What is more, article 15 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) gives way to open civil dialogues by ensuring the participation of civil society and by 
conducting their work as openly as possible166. 
 
2.4 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Although the treaties do not specifically target communication policies, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union frames the need for communication as a common value 
of the EU. Applicable articles range from Article 11 (right to information and freedom of 
expression as well as freedom and diversity of the media); Article 41 (right to be heard and right 
of access to documents relating to oneself); Article 42 (right of access to the documents of the EU 
institutions) and Article 44 (right of petition).  
 
2.5 European Citizens’ Initiative 
 
One of the most consolidated channels of communications is the European Citizens’ Initiative. 
This is one of the most important participatory instruments in EU democracy as it is supported by 
a consistent legal basis: article 11(4) of the TEU; article 24(1) of the TFEU; regulations (EU) No 
211/2011 and 2019/788; rules 222 and 230 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedures167. The concept of 
EU citizenship was introduced for the very first time in the Maastricht Treaty. However, it was not 
until 1996, in the preparation for the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, both the Austrian 
and Italian foreign ministers put forward the idea of creating the right for EU citizens to submit 
initiatives to the European Parliament since they reckoned it would be a way to put the right to 
petition into practice. The idea did not reach the Constitutional Treaty, yet it was brought back for 
the Lisbon Treaty. A total of six initiatives have reached the Commission after accomplishing one 
million signatures168. 
 
2.6 Conclusions on the Legal Framework 
 
The legal framework regarding European Communications gathers the provisions on 
democratic principles of the Treaty on European Union; the regulations on the European Citizen’s 
Initiative comprised of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and the Charter of 
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Fundamental Rights. The 2017 report Quality of Public Administration. A Toolbox for 
Practitioners169 portrays and elaborates on the transparency and democratic principle of the EU. 
Since top-down approaches would not comply with the TEU, it would appear that the second 
Barroso Commission regression to the top-down approach was going against these provisions on 
democratic principles. The ratification crisis of the Constitutional Treaty and the economic crisis 
in 2008 involved the reestablishment of top-down EU communications. The EU left aside the 
bottom-up approach accomplished back in 2006 with the White Paper and regressed to a top-down 
approach. This historical account reveals that this regression could be interpreted as an action 
against the TEU. 
After briefly presenting the legal framework behind European Communications, this essay 
presents the possibility that the audience-centric approach to communications would comply with 
the legal framework of EU communications. The reason behind the preference for the audience-
centric approach lays down on both the literature presented in this paper and European primary 
law. Both sources point towards this strategy as the most appropriate materialisation of the aims of 
the EU regarding European citizens and the legitimation of the EU in the public eye. On the other 
hand, top-down approaches would go against the legal framework of the Union. In order to prove 
that the bottom-up approach is the most fitted form of communications, two main questions are 
raised: 
1. Is there agreement among the academics regarding both internal and external 
communication theory? Is this agreement pointing towards the audience-centric approach? 
2. Is the EU implementing this audience-centric approach properly in the paradigmatic 
example of the European Citizen’s Initiative? What are the challenges? 
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3. Internal and External Communications 
This section upholds both internal communications and external communications as equally 
important regarding the application of an external bottom-up approach to communications.  This 
essay defends the idea that working towards the top-down approach on both internal and external 
approaches is the only feasible pathway towards complying with the provisions on democratic 
principles states in the Treaty on European Union. Moreover, this appears to be the sole pathway 
to achieving legitimation and public accountability. 
The EU’s communication strategy aims at interaction, transaction, exchange, and linkage of 
the institutions of the organisation and its target audience170. Public sector communications and 
society play a remarkable role in strengthening democracy, organisational legitimacy, and the 
transparency of the institution. A public institution such as the EU has the responsibility to engage 
with its citizens and understand the pivotal role of dialogue in public sector communication. The 
EU must lean towards diversity and inclusion of all EU citizens in order to be portrayed as a highly 
reliable institution, able to meet the expectations of the EU citizens. In fact, PR applied in public 
administration institutions works because it helps institutions become familiar with the real 
concerns of the citizens and if well-executed, citizens trust the institutions. This healthy 
relationship is essential from the point of view of the communications field. 
Moreover, if neither internal nor external communications do not work, neither does 
democracy. Without proper external communications, the voters are not aware of how the 
institution works; and neither do they have knowledge of the decisions taken on his behalf. Citizens 
cannot take full advantage of their rights and opportunities offered by democracy. Without all these 
elements in play, real democracy cannot take place171 
EU communications functions in parallel with political communication. Despite the intention to 
make EU communications an independent field from EU communications, there is no doubt that 
political decisions break the boundaries between pure communications and political 
communications. This overlap should be understood in the following manner: EU communications 
cannot solve political problems as it is not its target. This essay, therefore, defends the idea that EU 
communications should remain an apolitical organisational part of the EU.172 
 
3.1 Internal Communications 
 
On the one hand, internal communications constitute the core of the internal organisation of 
the institution. Traditional internal communications are based on pyramidal structures that have no 
room for adjustability or change. There is hesitation to change internal structures of public 
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administrations and this unwillingness to internal change negatively affects the public perception 
of public entities such as the EU. Public administrations must learn from the private sector since 
the latter is used to adaptability, creativity, and change. Private firms do not need to stick to strict 
bureaucracy, and this gives them space for trial and error. The private sector has set high bars in 
the eyes of the consumers in terms of the versatility and flexibility of the firms. These companies 
are wired for making a profit and current marketing theories point at consumer satisfaction as the 
number one concern to increase sales. Adaptability, change, and creativity are the main 
cornerstones of companies. According to Couto173, internal communications should constitute the 
main priority for public institutions because a proper internal organisation gathering marketing 
strategies is automatically projected into effective external communications if well executed. 
Couto174 adds to this idea by claiming that public administrations should adopt the figure of ad hoc 
departments for communications. This is still not a widespread practice among public 
administrations175. On the other hand, the EU already has this ad hoc department: The Directorate-
General for Communication176. 
Several authors have written about internal communications. While most advocate for an 
audience-centric approach, some consider top-down approaches as the most appropriate strategy. 
On the one hand, according to B. Stark177, most employees appreciate top-down communication 
because it is the only way to ensure a productive work environment and avoid rumours or loss of 
trust in management. Top-down communications give relevance to messages delivered by the 
company’s channels and reassure that these messages will not distract the employees nor waste 
their time nor overload them with unnecessary information. On the other hand, Couto presents the 
audience-centric approach as the most efficient approach to communications. According to 
Couto178 the three most common mistakes when implementing internal communications are the 
following: firstly, understanding internal communications as a unidirectional pathway to transmit 
messages and leaving aside the active listening of the employees’ opinions; secondly, accepting 
feedback but not allowing for more interaction among directorates —which would potentially 
increase the quality of this feedback —; thirdly, using internal communications aiming at 
persuasion rather than at establishing a proactive dialogue.  
Despite these conflicting views that the literature provides, this paper advocates for a bottom-
up approach within the EU because it parallels the strategy used in the private sector. This is the 
                                                             




176 “The Directorate-General for Communication is the Commission department responsible for explaining EU 
policies to outside audiences. It keeps the Commission abreast of political developments and of trends in public 
opinion and the media. It also coordinates communication campaigns within the Commission.” EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, “Communication | European Commission”, 2021, Retrieved March, 21 2021, from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/communication_en. For more information refer to section 1: Historical 
Evolution of EU’s Communication Strategy. 
177 P. BARRON STARK, Importance of Top-Down Business Communication, 2016, Retrieved April 2, 2021, from 
https://peterstark.com/critical-role-top-communication/. 
178 B. COUTO, La importancia de la comunicación interna para la comunicación externa, cit. 
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case because, as it appears from the data, the bottom-up strategy is proven to perform successfully 
in the private sector. This statement is further developed in this section. 
Internal communications play a crucial part in external communications due to two reasons: 
firstly, if internal communications are not coordinated properly, the integrity of the message will 
be affected; secondly, the reception of the message itself could be also compromised as the 
audience may not receive the message or may lose part of it179. As Philipp Clampitt180 puts it,  
Effective communication is the lifeblood of a successful organisation. It reinforces the organisation’s vision, 
connects employees to the business, fosters process improvement, facilitates change, and drives business 
results by changing employee behaviour. No matter how you look at it, communication is an important part 
of the business landscape and cannot be taken for granted.181 
External communications are based on trust, engagement, legitimacy, reputation, and 
satisfaction. However, as mention previously, the external communication strategy of any entity 
has its roots in internal communications. This is the case because external communications are 
mirroring the internal communications of a company. In the end, the staff of a particular company 
works to manufacture a product to then sell it to the target public. If the staff involved in the process 
does not work with the adequate internal communication strategy, the resulting product will not be 
saleable and external communications will fail. Misleading PR strategies may lead to good results 
with a bad product. However, this paper understands that creating a misleading PR strategy is not 
the objective pursued by the EU. 
Private firms apply this audience approach to both their internal communications and external 
communications. Many famous private firms in the world follow a horizontal internal structure 
which allows for greater participation of both employers and employees. Steve Jobs, the CEO and 
co-founder of Apple Inc., described his own company as “the biggest start-up on the planet”: 
One of the keys to Apple is Apple’s an incredibly collaborative company. You know how many committees we 
have at Apple? Zero. We have no committees. We are organized like a start-up. One person’s in charge of iPhone 
OS software, one person’s in charge of Mac hardware, one person’s in charge of iPhone hardware engineering, 
another person’s in charge of worldwide marketing, another person’s in charge of operations. We are organized 
like a startup. We are the biggest startup on the planet.182 
The application of the horizontal internal structure in public administration is a difficult 
pathway because this process would put the institutionalisation of the EU at risk. One wonders if 
this would involve a counter-productive effect. While opting for a more ductile approach to the 
internal structure may contribute to greater participation and ductility of the Union, many would 
argue that these steps are putting the integration process at risk. However, if EU communications 
and EU politics were to be treated as two separate issues, it would make sense for the EU to adopt 
the private firm model as an innovative strategy to mirror what already works for the private sector. 
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Although there is very little literature regarding the internal communication structure of the 
EU, the internal structure of the organisation sheds a light on its internal functioning. The EU is 
constituted by a series of institutions that work together to accomplish the general goals set by the 
Union in the Treaty of the European Union. The European Parliament, the Council of the EU and 
the European Commission are the three main institutions comprising the EU. Although they are 
different institutions, they work together to achieve the Union’s aims. 
An instance of a more informal internal structure is the tripartite meetings or trilogues. These 
are informal interinstitutional negotiations between representatives of the Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission on legislative proposals183. The main aim of the trilogues is to accelerate the 
ordinary legislative procedure by pre-negotiating legislative proposals in an informal manner184. 
The informal nature of this process was perceived as a lack of transparency. In order to avoid this 
lack of transparency, the EU officialised tripartite meetings in November 2012185.  
Despite this instance of horizontal-like structures, this essay considers that trialogues are not 
enough to achieve the bottom-up approach that this paper advocates for.  The internal structure of 
the EU appears to remain anchored in burdening bureaucratic processes. This undermines applying 
Steven Jobs’ theory of horizontal organisations.  
The fact that the EU is a highly bureaucratic institution also undercuts its chances to adapt to 
a more ductile internal structure. However, efforts similar to the trialogues could be extended to 
other areas of the institutions of the EU to establish a more pragmatic, bottom-up approach to the 
internal functioning of the EU. Improving and promoting horizontal communications among 
departments such as the creation of focal points for employees could lead to an improvement of 
this internal structure. 
 
3.2 External Communications 
 
External communications aim at establishing healthy interactions with the target audience186.  
According to Canel & Luoma-aho,187 external communications could be defined as: 
Goal-oriented communication inside organisations and between organisations and their stakeholders that 
enables public sector functions within their specific cultural and/or political settings, with the purpose of 
building and maintaining the public good and trust between citizens and authorities.188 
The literature presents two distinct ways to approach external communications. The two 
different approaches are the following: top-down communications and bottom-up communications: 
                                                             
183 EUROPA.EU, “Interinstitutional negotiations | Ordinary Legislative Procedure | European Parliament”, 2021, 
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 External Top-down communications: traditional and outdated communications strategy 
based on a purely hierarchical structure in which the institutions views play a pivotal role 
while the target audience is relegated and perceived as second-class opinions. This 
approach is unidirectional and purely informative where there is no room for conversation 
between the institution and the target audience.189 
 External Bottom-up communications: Approach to communications consisting of building 
proactive communicative dialogues with the target audience which involves the 
establishment of the so-called bidirectional or two-way communicative channels to ensure 
inclusive participation. The audience plays an active role and establishes a communicative 
dialogue with the institution involving recurrent feedback.190 
While top-down communications used to rule over any other approach to communications, 
this is not the case anymore. External communications used to follow a top-down structure, yet this 
tendency is not in place anymore. As Mary P.Follet191 claims, institutions stopped holding power 
over citizens to transition towards holding power with citizens. Thijs & Staes192 add to this 
argument by stating that public administrations “should be more responsible to society’s needs and 
demands”.  
This transition from top-down approaches to bottom-up approaches occurred due to the rapidly 
changing citizens’ demands and expectations. Expectations from EU citizens on the EU grew 
exponentially due to the rise of the private sector. Citizens are currently engaging in fast pace 
working systems where clients can purchase any item immediately and remotely. This is a high bar 
to live up to and the public administration is struggling to fulfil the publics’ expectations193. The 
public administration is usually blamed for bureaucracy, slowness, inefficiency, and corruption. 
As a result, the EU is unable to keep up with the new expectations of public sector organisations. 
The public sector is still unable to establish a communication mechanism between citizens and the 
EU as sturdy as the one established by private firms. The private sector has given voice to the 
public eye and now receive constant and live feedback to improve, change or evolve their products 
by actively listening to their clients’ demands194. 
These demands and expectations created the so-called communication gaps195. A 
communication gap is commonly thought of as the deficit taking place when the message intended 
by the sender is not properly understood by the recipient. 
In order to close these gaps, external communications theory relies on a series of principles 
that structure public administration. These values or principles of how the public administration 
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should function are relevant for external communications because external communications must 
mirror said values and transmit them to the public eye. Popescu196 conceptualises provides a list of 
principles or values that public administrations should follow. According to this author, the 
“principles of organising and functioning of public services” list as follows: 
1. The principle of continuity: an activity must remain steady in time 
2. The principle of reality: the public administration must be tangible and provide the results 
that the public eye demand. 
3. The principle of quantification: the result of the institutions’ actions must have a tangible 
nature as well as being measurable. 
4. The principle of permanent adaptability: the necessity to create a public administration that 
is directly under public control. The personnel can be changed for the sake of good 
management. 
5. The principle of equality: discrimination is not allowed. 
 
Both the principle of reality and the principle of permanent adaptability mention the figure of 
the public eye as more than mere spectators or passive members of the public administration. The 
principle of reality is implying that the public sector relies on the citizens as it needs to act on an 
on-demand basis. Moreover, the principle of permanent adaptability mentions the concept of 
“direct public control” which emphasises this pivotal role played by the citizens.  
This essay defends that the “principles of organising and functioning of public services” can 
be one of the reasons behind the overall transition from top-down approaches to bottom-up 
approaches in public administration. This is because, in order to meet the public eye's expectations, 
only the bottom-up approach can establish the two-way channels necessary to comply with the 
principles. The top-down, informative approach would not allow for this public control that 
Popescu advocates for. 
As well as the principle of organising and functioning of public services the theory of 
“intangible assets” also backs up the necessity of this external audience-centric approach to 
communications. The “intangible assets” of an organisation are the non-physical realities that 
increase the value of the organisation197. The competitive advantage of an organisation is based on 
intangible assets. They are elements that are under the control of the organisation since they are 
distinctive from other companies. Companies expect an economic profit out of these intangible 
assets. In other words, intangible assets are meant to enhance the flourishing of tangible assets. 
Many argue that this does not apply to the public sector because there is no market value involved 
in the public administration. However, some may apply. Relying on intangible assets can directly 
improve communication in the public sector198. 
According to Canel & Luoma-aho199, the applicable intangible assets in the public 
administration are the following: 
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1. Satisfaction: the overall pleasantness of the public service experience. 
2. Organisational culture: the extent to which the organisation is aligned with certain core 
principles. 
3. Reputation: the overall impression of the organisation’s past deeds. 
4. Legitimacy: the acceptance of the organisation and its functions by the organisation’s 
publics. 
5. Intellectual capital: the extent to which an organisation manages knowledge well. 
6. Engagement: the capacity of an organisation to get citizens involved in public 
administration processes. 
7. Social capital: the capacity of an organisation to generate social cohesion. 
8. Trust: the capacity of an organisation to be granted discretion in the use of public 
resources for the provision of public services within a context of uncertainty, and from 
which certain compliance emerges among other parties. 
 
This author defends the idea that a public administration can only bridge the gaps between the 
citizens and the institution if the administration complies with these intangible assets.  It is only 
through the completion of intangible assets that the administration can aim at generating the 
following tangible gains: authority, credibility, acceptance, stability, support, credibility, loyalty, 
certainty, effectiveness, trust, social cohesion, social support, accountability, legitimacy, sense of 
security and belonging, citizen collaboration, sense of community, resilience and empowerment. 
If all these assets were addressed, the abovementioned tangible gains could contribute to the 
closure of communication gaps such as the following: 
1. The gap between the one-directional and static nature of traditional public sector 
communication and the need to more effectively meet citizens’ needs and changing 
expectations. 
2. The gap between real achievements and people’s perceptions. 
3. The gap between professionals and civil servants on the one hand and ordinary citizens on 
the other. 
The theory of the intangible assets is primarily aimed at filling gap number 1: a growing need to 
meet with citizens’ expectations which are not being addressed by the traditional top-down 
approach. This paper concludes this section by advocating for the application of intangible assets 
in the external communications of the EU as justifies the transition from the top-down approach 
during the second Barroso Commission to the audience-centric methods started by Juncker’s 
Commission and currently followed by von der Leyen. Closing the communication gaps would 
lead to what should constitute the ultimate aim for external communications: strengthening 
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4. The European Citizens’ Initiative 
The present section tackles the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) as a paradigmatic example 
of the EU’s audience-centric approach to communications. Among the current means of EU citizen 
participation, the ECI is a widely discussed instrument in the literature. 
There is currently an array of available citizen-participation tools in the EU. The only two-way 
channel with the European Commission which is explicitly addressed in the primary law text of 
the EU is the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). ECI allows citizens to submit proposals on EU 
legislation. EU citizens need to get the signatures of at least 1 million people from at least seven 
EU countries to be able to submit their initiative, as well as complying with an array of bureaucratic 
steps. 
The consistent legal basis supporting this two-way channel has led to its consolidation as a 
solid means of conversation between EU citizens and the EU. As mentioned previously in this 
paper, the legal basis of this channel is the following: article 11(4) of the TEU; article 24(1) of the 
TFEU; regulations (EU) No 211/2011 and 2019/788; rules 222 and 230 of Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedures200. 
The initiative to create this channel was born in 1996 during the preparation for the Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conference. Both the Austrian and Italian foreign ministers put forward the idea 
of creating the right for EU citizens to submit initiatives to the European Parliament since they 
reckoned it would be a way to put the right to petition into practice. The idea did not reach the 
Constitutional Treaty, yet it was brought back for the Lisbon Treaty. A total of six initiatives have 
reached the Commission after accomplishing one million signatures201. 
The provisions on democratic principles found under Title II of the TEU enriches the Citizens’ 
Initiative. The democratic rights of political participation listed in the TEU are materialised in the 
Citizen’s Initiative. The actual adoption of the text by the Parliament and the Council took place 
on 16 February 2011 yet it entered into force on 1 April 2011. A series of changes were 
implemented over the first years of this communicative channel202. 
Despite the initial efforts to live up to the democratic provisions from the TEU, Glogowski & 
Maurer203 claim that at the time ECI was not imposing legal obligations upon EU institutions. 
According to these authors, ECI was in a very weak stage of participatory democracy yet it was 
still seen as a prosperous instrument because it stimulated the participation of the citizens204. 
Other authors such as Garcia & Greenwood205 reckon that ECI has attracted public 
campaigners because this tool stimulates public debate and institutionalises a proposal. These 
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authors also mention the fact that ECI is making public campaigners relevant which would 
otherwise receive little to no attention. Furthermore, even if the proposal is rejected, it can now fall 
under a legal dispute before the European Court of Justice. Proposals linger in time and allow to 
play the politics of the EU. 
There are concerns raised by authors such as Athanasiadou206 regarding the regulation and 
application of the admissibility conditions of the European Citizens’ Initiative. According to this 
author, the admissibility requirements concerning the purposes of an initiative should become clear 
before the collection of signature starts. As Athanasiadou207 puts it, 
When it is unclear whether an initiative falls or not within Union powers, a broad interpretation of the Union 
competencies would collide with the principle of conferral. Furthermore, not clearing from the outset 
admissibility issues might interfere with the principle of legal certainty or legitimate expectations, if citizens 
rely on the admissibility of the content of an initiative, while the Commission after the collection of 
signatures denies any possibility of action due to lack of competence, as it occurred in the case of the 
initiative Right2Water.208 
Karatzia209 contributes with relevant remarks regarding the democratic nature of ECI. This 
author led to the conclusion that the value of an ECI’s proposal depended on whether the 
Commission considered it to be relevant to propose legislative acts. Moreover, if an ECI’s proposal 
was going against the objectives or purposes of legislation that was recently adopted, then this 
proposal would not be considered. This situation would be going against article 10.2 TEU and 
Article 11.4 TEU. 
In sum, the ECI was perceived as a proactive tool, an enabler for campaigns and debates yet it 
was still in a very early stage that did not imply enforceable provisions. This facultative nature was 
heavily criticised. Moreover, the admissibility requirements usually remain unclear for the public 
campaigners and there is also a lack of direct contact with the EU in case campaigners have doubts 
regarding the process. Finally, the EU is thought to be going against democratic principles when 
denying proposals either because they are not relevant enough from the point of view of the EU or 
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Missteps might have been taken in European communications by the European Commission 
during times of political adversity. This was the case of the regression to the top-down approach 
after the failure of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. This regression meant considering the 
public views’ as second class opinions. The Barroso Commission did not acknowledge the negative 
public response to the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, Barroso solely shifted the approach to 
communications to a top-down approach, disregarding the views of EU citizens. This paper 
advocates for enhancing and improving the bottom-up approach to communications while 
excluding the top-down approach. The latter goes against principles of public scrutiny and 
accountability. The bottom-up approach is believed to be the most feasible option to address 
European communications. 
The top-down approach to both internal and external communications appears to be the sole 
appropriate method to comply with the general principle on transparency and democratic values of 
the EU; articles 9; 10.3; 10.4; 11.1; 11.2; 11.3 and 11.4 (TEU) regarding specific democratic 
principles; articles 11, 41, 42 and 44 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; article 11(4) of the 
TEU; article 24(1) of the TFEU; and regulations (EU) No 211/2011 and 2019/788; rules 222 and 
230 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedures —regarding the European Citizens’ Initiative regulations 
—. 
The top-down approach on both internal and external communications is the only feasible 
pathway towards complying with the provisions on democratic principles stated in the Treaty on 
European Union. Moreover, this appears to be the sole pathway to achieving legitimation and 
public accountability.  
Regarding internal communications, most academics lean towards the bottom-up approach as 
the method which allows for greater participation of both employers and employees. The EU  
already has horizontal-like structures such as tripartite meetings. However, efforts similar to the 
trialogues could be extended to other areas of the institutions of the EU to establish a more 
pragmatic, bottom-up approach to the internal functioning of the EU. 
Regarding external communications, the top-down approach should remain in place in order 
to meet the rapidly changing demands and expectations of the citizens. These demands created 
communication gaps between EU citizens and the EU. Addressing intangible assets such as 
satisfaction, reputation, legitimacy, engagement and trust, among others contributes to the closure 
of communicative gaps. 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is a paradigmatic example of the European 
Commission’s audience-centric approach to communications. It is concluded that the ECI is 
perceived as a proactive tool, an enabler for campaigns and debates, yet it is still in a very early 
stage as it appears not to comply with the democratic provisions of the TEU. The admissibility 
requirements usually remain unclear for the public campaigners and there is also a lack of direct 
contact with the EU in case campaigners have doubts regarding the process. 
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In sum, this paper urges to 
 Enhance and improve the bottom-up approach while excluding top-down approaches since 
the latter goes against principles of public scrutiny and accountability.  
 Consider the top-down approach to both internal and external communications as the sole 
appropriate method to comply with the primary law of the EU. 
 Boost efforts similar to the trialogues in other areas of the institutions of the EU in order to 
establish a more pragmatic, bottom-up approach to the internal functioning of the EU. 
 Embrace intangible assets such as satisfaction, reputation, legitimacy, engagement, and 
trust, among others. These should be addressed by following the audience-centric model. 
This way the EU might be able to contribute to the closure of communication gaps. 
 Enhance audience-centric tools such as the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) in order to 
make them fully comply with the democratic values of the EU. 
 
This paper has aimed at opening a dialogue on public sector communications and at 
highlighting the importance of addressing communications as a pivotal issue within the EU.  The 
public administration has been blamed for bureaucracy, slowness, inefficiency, and corruption. 
This has potentially worsened the relationship between the public sector, and its target audience, 
the citizens. 
The EU is a political actor which is faced with public scrutiny on a daily basis. 
Communications cannot solve political issues of the EU but rather mirror the EU’s actions and 
transmit EU decisions to the public. European communications cannot solve economic, social, 
political or environmental problems yet it can shed a light on the promotion of identity, integration 
and democracy. 
While EU citizens own the right to access information about the public bodies of the EU, 
citizens still struggle to establish active means of communication between the EU and themselves. 
European communication is a complex issue as the EU is an institutional multi-level system. The 
complexity of the internal system of the EU is perceived as far too complicated by the EU citizens; 
the simplification of the treaties has not been properly addressed, making it harder for the average 
EU population to fully understand the legal basis of EU law; and the language policies are still not 
able to address the clear dominance of English over the rest of EU languages. 
Despite its complexity, communications are relevant for international relations fields since the 
communication strategy of the EU affects the legitimacy, accountability, and democratic nature of 
the institution. Effective communication may lead the institution towards reassuring its legitimacy 
in the public eye. 
Other questions may be raised when considering the EU’s communication strategy: 
If the EU is already having trouble communicating with EU citizens, can they do a good job 
communicating with countries from the Eastern Partnership (EaP) or the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)? These relations with third countries have been considered utilitarian policies that 
have little to do with the promotion of democracy and a lot about migration control. Can we think 
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about third countries relations if we are portraying the EU as a political union when it is in fact 
acting as an economic union? 
Are the requirements of the European Citizens’ Initiative too strict to comply with the 
democratic provisions of the treaties? The ECI requires one million people from at least seven EU 
countries to be able to submit an initiative. Is this the most democratic option to channel the 
citizens’ views to the European Commission? Should individuals have the right to submit their 
initiatives without this vast support? 
This paper believes that there is a need for an increased understanding between the EU and 
EU citizens by enhancing the audience-centric approach to communications. The top-down 
approach is the ultimate pathway to close communication gaps and to strengthen communication 
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